Was the Battle of Borodino necessary? Battle of Borodino between Russia and France. Who has the victory

“Only in Russia and Spain did Napoleon encounter a real frenzy of the people. People left their dwellings, sometimes burned them, stole cattle, only so that the enemy would not get it, ”historian Alexander Valkovich told the VZGLYAD newspaper. At the same time, the Patriotic War was overgrown with myths; its events in Russia and France can be interpreted in completely different ways. Whose side is the truth on?

On Friday, Russia celebrates one of the days of military glory - the Day of the Battle of Borodino. The legendary battle ended exactly 205 years ago, but there are still disputes - in whose favor?

Historians also argue about the significance of this battle for the conflict between Russia and France, for Napoleon personally and for the fate of the world as a whole. About the myths that accompany the memory of Borodino, about the opposition to Kutuzov in the Russian army, about the marauders and about the popular character of that war, the VZGLYAD newspaper talked with the president of the International Military Historical Association, Alexander Valkovich.

VZGLYAD: Let's immediately try to debunk the most famous myths about the Battle of Borodino ...

Alexander Valkovich: Willingly. Myth number one is that Borodino was a turning point in the Patriotic War of 1812. This is not true. The real turning point occurred later, on October 12 (24), 1812 at Maloyaroslavets. It was after him that Napoleon was forced to abandon offensive actions and retreat, and the Russian command took the initiative into their own hands. Borodino was the only pitched battle during that war.

Myth number 2. Regarding the fact that both in the ranks of the French and in our ranks there was complete unity, all the generals merged in a single impulse. This is not true. Serious disagreements were observed both between the Russian generals and between the Napoleonic marshals. If we talk about the Russian army, we have not only Barclay de Tolly was dissatisfied with the appointment of Kutuzov as commander in chief, which, in principle, is known. Also Bagration was against it. It was he who was considered the most promising student and favorite of Suvorov. In a word, the Russian army had its own opposition, its own opposition, and Russian politics had its own "French" and "English" parties.

Finally, the main myth. We were convinced from the school bench that the Russian army won at Borodino. In fact, none of the opposing sides achieved their goals. The French were unable to defeat our army, and our army held out, but retreated, maintaining order. On points, to use boxing terminology, Russia lost. The army that leaves the battlefield first is considered the loser. However, the formally victorious French did not solve their tasks, they were dejected by the outcome of the battle, and soon lost the war altogether. Therefore, it would be more correct to say that there was a draw under Borodino.

VZGLYAD: Is Napoleon's cold also a myth? Like, if he hadn’t had a runny nose that day, could everything have gone differently?

AV: Napoleon was really unwell. But his cold could no longer affect either the disposition he had drawn up earlier, or other key parameters of the battle. He determined the direction of the main attack of the French army in advance. “Having started the car”, the French emperor could no longer significantly influence its movement; his marshals and generals, corps commanders were already responsible for the outcome of the battle to a greater extent.

VZGLYAD: That is, he was responsible for the strategy. Didn't he influence tactical issues anymore?

A. V .: Influenced, but only partially. Napoleon's only decision on the battlefield, which theoretically could significantly change the course of the battle, was to launch or not to launch his Old Guard, the most elite unit. The marshals asked him about it, but he did not agree. If Napoleon had broken through the line of Russian defense with the help of the Old Guard, yes, the outcome could have been different. But we can talk about this only in the subjunctive mood.

In addition, the decision to leave the Old Guard in reserve from the point of view of Napoleon himself was the right one. After all, it was this elite unit that subsequently saved his life, saved the remnants of his retreating army in the battle of Krasnoe.

VZGLYAD: What other mistakes did Napoleon make? Or did he do everything right, but he was unlucky?

A. V .: From the height of our current knowledge, Napoleon’s decision to start a war with Russia could be called a fatal mistake. And at Borodino, he acted in the forehead, although, for example, Marshal Davout suggested that he go to the Russian left flank, where our most vulnerable position was.

VZGLYAD: Is “General Frost” a myth or not a myth?

A.V.: Mostly a myth. If you look objectively, the French left Moscow in mid-October, when the weather was fine in autumn. And only at the end of November - December it became really cold.

At the same time, the French themselves are to a large extent to blame for their problems, who, while in Moscow, did not take sufficient measures, did not prepare stocks of warm clothes. For example, the more prudent Poles, who also sided with Napoleon, took care of this in advance, dressed warmer and shod their horses. During the retreat, when the roads froze, the unshod French horses slipped and fell en masse.

VZGLYAD: That is, it was not the climate that failed the French, but their own hindsight?

A.V.: Yes. But that's not even the point. The main thing is the demoralization of the army, which began with Moscow. The result is complete disorganization. The French had collected large stocks of food in Smolensk, but they were never able to organize its distribution during the retreat. Most of the supplies were simply looted. And already no actions of Napoleon - even the execution of marauders - could improve his position.

In addition, the factor of the "people's" war played a serious role against Napoleon. Just as in Spain, in Russia he faced a real frenzy of the people. Only in these two countries did people leave their dwellings, sometimes they burned them, they stole cattle, only so that the enemy would not get it.

VZGLYAD: If there was a draw near Borodino and Borodino was not the battle that determined the course of the war, why do we single it out? Could another, definitely victorious.

A.V.: Firstly, because it was the biggest battle of that campaign. And, secondly, as Lev Nikolaevich Tolstoy rightly put it, at Borodino the Russians won a moral victory. Our troops showed mass heroism. Without hesitation, they sacrificed themselves. From a soldier to a general, everyone had one thought: the enemy should not be in the heart of our Motherland, in Moscow. And although Moscow was briefly abandoned later, Borodino, in fact, is a monument to the dedication, resilience and courage of Russians.

Borodino has long been considered a turning point battle for other reasons. In addition to heavy casualties, the real disaster for Napoleon was the loss of a significant part of the cavalry. The Borodino field is called the grave of the French cavalry. And the cavalry is called upon to go in the forefront, to cover the march of their army, to carry out reconnaissance, to ensure maneuvering. The French could not make up for the loss in the horse composition. Therefore, the rest of the time, Napoleon acted, by and large, blindly. It was not for nothing that the cavalry was called at that time the "eyes and ears" of the army.

VZGLYAD: How many people from both sides participated in the battle, how many losses were there?

A.V.: Over 130,000 French and, according to the latest data, about 150,000 Russians, if you count together with the militia. But usually, when comparing regular armies, the militia is not taken into account. In general, the forces were approximately equal. In terms of losses - the French lost more than 30 thousand people, ours - 48 thousand killed, wounded and missing.

VZGLYAD: Why did more of ours die?

A.V .: Napoleon was famous for his ability to assemble into “one fist”, to ensure the superiority of artillery in the direction of the main attack. Our main losses are connected with this. Much more Russian soldiers died from the fire of French artillery than from the Russian - the French and their allies.

VZGLYAD: Can Borodino be called the bloodiest one-day battle at that time?

AV: Strictly speaking, Borodino was not a one-day battle. He was preceded by the Shevardinsky battle. Together with him, the Battle of Borodino lasted two days.

In 1812, this was indeed the most significant and bloody battle. But, if we talk about the entire long-term war, including the Foreign Campaign of the Russian army, then in the three-day battle near Leipzig in October 1813, in the so-called “Battle of the Nations”, more than 190 thousand people fought on the side of the French, on the side of Russia and its allies - over 350 thousand. As a result, the French lost 60 thousand, and the allies - more than 50 thousand.

VZGLYAD: How big are the discrepancies regarding the assessment of the Battle of Borodino among our and foreign historians? Say, the French unambiguously give victory to Napoleon's army?

A.V.: For a long time, for a century and even two after Borodino, the myth of the complete victory of the French was really popular abroad. But in recent decades in the West, in France, a lot of critical literature has appeared on this subject. In general, the events at Borodino are now given a much more restrained assessment. Serious historians abroad also talk not only about the formal outcome of the battle, but also about what this “winning” gave the French, what it brought them to later. Increased fame? May be. But they did not solve the tasks at all.

VZGLYAD: Why do Russian and French historians have discrepancies even in terms of losses at Borodino? The French estimate their losses at a maximum of 28 thousand people, and Russian and British historians at 35 thousand?

A.V.: Because the French historians had in mind only the actual losses in the French units and did not mention the losses in the troops allied to Napoleon. You should not look for something else here.

VZGLYAD: To what extent, in principle, has politics dominated and continues to dominate objective perception? Probably, French artists were more willing to paint respectable Napoleonic marshals in the middle of the Moscow fire than retreating and freezing soldiers of the Great Army. It is also somehow not heard that the French actively recalled the looting of their soldiers in the Moscow Kremlin or the arrangement of stables in churches.

A.V.: I do not agree. It seems to me that the French battle painters quite often depicted scenes of the retreat of their army in 1812. In my opinion, no one is hiding anything on purpose. It is known about the victories, and about the defeats, and about the facts of looting, which are inherent in almost every war.

It is clear that when crossing the Neman, entering Russia, the soldiers of the Napoleonic army wanted to increase not only glory, but also wealth. It is clear that for the French it was not a war to defend their borders, but a war of conquest. Therefore, everything is logical. Russian soldiers during the Foreign campaign, having entered Paris, were also engaged in looting. It was not of a mass nature, but it also happened.

Perhaps someone romanticizes the war of 1812 too much. Yes, then there were cases when prisoners were released on parole that they would not fight for some time. But there was blood and looting. War is war.

For 200 years, the war of 1812 has acquired stamps that have little in common with real events


How are historical myths born? Children's mistakes appear first. And often at the heart of the historical myth is someone's initial mistake. Unless, of course, the task of creating a historical myth was not consciously set by someone.

On one of the St. Petersburg channels flashed a story dedicated to the heroes of the Patriotic War of 1812. In the frame - the grave of Ivan Dibich at the Volkovsky cemetery behind the back of the female correspondent. And the confident face of this girl, who tells about the exploits of Colonel Dibich near Yakubov, Klyastitsy, Golovshchina.

For those battles, the officer was awarded the Order of St. George III degree, mostly a general's award. It was only later that Ivan Dibich rose to the rank of Field Marshal, became one of 25 people in history who received the Order of St. George I degree. For successes in the Russian-Turkish war of 1828-1829, the honorary prefix "Trans-Balkan" was added to his surname by decree of the emperor. And really, who in Russia has not heard of Dibich-Zabalkansky?

It turned out that the correspondent did not hear. During the report, she spoke without a shadow of a doubt about some general Dibich-Zabolotsky.

Is this how historical myths are born? No, this is how children's mistakes appear. But let's think about whether there is a big difference between a mistake and a myth. And what underlies the historical myth. Was it someone else's original mistake? Unless, of course, the task of creating a historical myth was not consciously set by someone.

Time passes, and the error turns into a myth, and the legend introduced into the consciousness into a stamp, which most people already perceive as a historical fact. The war of 1812 did not escape this fate, and for 200 years it has acquired myths and clichés that have little in common with real events.

Sometimes they are local in nature, without distorting the essence of the historical process. For example, a stamp associated with the death of Major General Yakov Kulnev near Klyastitsy on August 1, 1812. How now to convince many people that Kulnev was not at all the first Russian general killed in that war? A few days before the Klyastitsky battle, there was a battle near Ostrovno, in which the chief of the Rylsk Infantry Regiment, Major General Okulov, died. It's easy to find out about it. But people are trusting. And since they write in books and articles that the first dead general is Kulnev, then so be it.

Another snippet. The moral feat of General Nikolai Raevsky in the battle near Saltanovka on July 23, 1812, when, having personally led the frontal attack of the Smolensk Infantry Regiment, the corps commander Raevsky led two sons in the forefront, the youngest of whom was only 11 years old. When the legend infiltrated the masses, Raevsky himself refuted this myth. But it was too late. So until now, three Raevskys go on the attack near Saltanovka.

There are cliches-myths that affect the perception of historical events much more seriously. They work on the subconscious of people. As a result, they form a national perception of history, deform the self-esteem of the people, and correct the system of national and universal values.

The most common stereotypes about the war of 1812 are the colossal losses in the Battle of Borodino, the total fire in Moscow, the decisive role of the partisan movement, the no less decisive role of “General Frost” and the periodization of the war itself.

If we start from the thesis that everything was so, then an involuntary question arises: what, in fact, did the Russian army and commander Kutuzov do if Napoleon was knocked down by a fire, peasants with pitchforks and severe Russian cold? And also - why and with whom did Russia fight for another 15 months after the French left our borders, if the war ended on the Berezina in December 1812?

But let's go in order.

The battle of Borodino went down in history not at all because it was especially bloody, and the losses of the parties exceeded all conceivable limits. Long before Borodino, Hannibal destroyed 60,000 Romans near Cannes, using only edged weapons. Who argues, and on the Borodino field blood flowed in torrents. But speaking of losses, it is worth sticking to proven facts. And they are as follows: the total losses of the Russian side on September 5-7 in the Shevardinsky and Borodino battles, including the wounded and missing - 39 thousand. Of these, 14,000 were killed and 10,000 were missing. Our army has been reduced by one third. Indeed, before the battle, she numbered a little more than 100 thousand people in regular units, over 8 thousand Cossacks and from 10-20 thousand militias.

The French were much worse off. Of the 130-135 thousand soldiers and officers whom Napoleon brought to Borodino, a little more than half remained in the ranks. The total losses of the Great Army are estimated at 58-60 thousand bayonets and sabers. Only officers Bonaparte lost about 2 thousand people. It is interesting that modern French researchers are also convinced that the losses of Napoleon's army appearing in the studies of the 19th century are greatly underestimated.

You can debate endlessly. There are clichés on the topic of the terrible losses of the Russians, which prompted Kutuzov to surrender Moscow and which testify to the absolute superiority of the Napoleonic genius. And there are scientific methods and historical documents, with the help of which only one can find the truth.

General Caulaincourt recalled how, during a detour of the battlefield, Napoleon stopped at the Raevsky battery and saw an officer with eight dozen infantrymen. The emperor invited the officer to join his regiment. To which he, waving his hand in the direction of the redoubt, replied: "My regiment is here." Napoleon repeated the order, but the officer again pointed to the ramparts. And only then it became clear that 80 soldiers were all that was left of a regiment of several thousand.

“Moscow, burnt down by fire...” - Lermontov's brilliant lines are not at all the basis for purely historical conclusions. The poet has the right to exaggerate. In fact, the Moscow fire of 1812 did not burn down the entire capital city. A third of civil buildings and two thirds of temples survived. Therefore, radical hysterical assessments and comparisons with Stalingrad in 1943 are inappropriate. More than 70% of the inhabitants remained in the city during the occupation by the Great Army. The fact remains that the French behaved in Moscow, to put it mildly, barbarically: it was plundered, many churches were desecrated, executions of civilians were recorded.

The popular expression of Leo Tolstoy about the cudgel of the people's war made it possible in Soviet times to create a stamp about the colossal influence on the results of the 1812 campaign of the peasant partisan detachments, which destroyed the rear communications of the French, took the enemy prisoner by the thousands, depriving him of fodder and supplies. They also distorted the role of regular partisan formations, which allegedly arose on the initiative of Lieutenant Colonel Akhtyrsky Hussars Denis Davydov. The first army flying group in the Moscow direction appeared in August on the orders of Barclay de Tolly, and was commanded by General Winzingerode. But even earlier, the initiative was taken by the commander of the 3rd Observation Army, General Tormasov, who defended the south of the country.

From the ranks of the army, eight cavalry, five infantry regiments, 13 regiments of Cossack irregular cavalry were sent to flying detachments. I would call these units airborne sabotage, not partisan. Davydov, Figner, Dorokhov, Seslavin remained career officers and did not turn into people's avengers at all.

The peasant partisan movement made a worthy contribution to the defeat of the Great Army. But the regular army played a key role in driving out the enemy. It seems to me that by the cudgel of the people's war, Count Tolstoy did not mean Vasilisa Kozhina or even the 6,000-strong detachment of the peasant Kurin, but the general condition of the entire multi-class Russian people, including professional military men.

The next stamp is the most derogatory for the Russian army: it was not military operations, but frost that killed the Frenchman. In response, it is easier to quote Napoleon himself: “The main reasons for the unsuccessful enterprise in Russia were attributed to early and excessive cold: This is completely false. How can I think that I do not know about the date of this annual phenomenon in Russia? Not only did winter not come earlier than usual, but its arrival on October 26 (November 7, NS - "Labor") was later than it happens every year. Further, Bonaparte writes that in November a thaw began, which lasted until the remnants of the army approached the Berezina.

Denis Davydov wrote not only poetry, but also military-historical notes. It is enough to read eyewitness accounts to forget about "General Frost" forever.

And the last. Let's ask ourselves why today we celebrate the victory in the Great Patriotic War not in October, but in May? After all, the German army was removed from the USSR in October 1944. The Russian army waged war with Napoleonic France until the end of March 1814, when it victoriously entered Paris. And it is wrong to divide this war into the Patriotic War of 1812 and the Foreign Campaigns of 1813-1814 from a historical and, most importantly, moral point of view.

By the way, General Ivan Dibich-Zabalkansky also took Paris. I cannot say the same about Dibich-Zabolotsky.

At 5.30 in the morning the French began shelling, and then went on the attack on the Russian positions. The battle lasted 12 hours. Historians are still arguing about the death toll. The most realistic figures: from 80 to 100 thousand people. Every minute (!) More than a hundred people died on the battlefield. It was the bloodiest one-day battle in history.

EVEN BONDARCHUK DID NOT HAVE SUCH A CROWD

On the Borodino field, Kutuzov and Napoleon ride side by side on horseback and peacefully discuss the battle that has just died down. Such a picture could be observed near Mozhaisk, where enthusiasts from the military-historical clubs of Russia, Europe, the USA and Canada played a show - a reconstruction of the great battle. More than 80 thousand spectators gathered to watch it. About three thousand people participated in the large-scale production. Infantry, horse dragoons with Cossacks - all in costumes and with weapons from the time of 1812. Three hundred cannons rumbled and belched smoke on the battlefield - 30 tons of black smokeless powder were brought in for firing. As the organizers proudly admitted, even Sergei Bondarchuk did not have such extras on the set of War and Peace. The French also came to Borodino. Naturally, they "fought" in the army of their emperor and, like two hundred years ago, desperately "cut" with the Russian "barbarians".


Photo: Sergey SHAKHIJANYAN

HOW NAPOLEON SUPERFUSED

One of the generals in the retinue of Count Kutuzov turned out to be the director of this entire event. His Excellency Alexander Valkovich, President of the International Military Historical Association. As befits a noble general, he agreed to talk without dismounting from his horse. For the first time I had to take an interview, located somewhere at the stirrup and looking at the interlocutor from the bottom up. The heated horse at each cannon burst strove to kick the photographer. But the "general" was imperturbable.

From a formal point of view, the French won, - admitted Alexander Mikhailovich. - But Leo Tolstoy wrote correctly. The moral victory was on the side of the Russian army. The battle that the whole country desired was given. Our soldiers and officers felt that with the invincible army of Napoleon, who captured the whole of Europe, they fought on equal terms.

Now many historians say that Kutuzov allegedly chose the wrong position, did not place the troops in the right way.

Kutuzov did not have much choice. Another thing is that Napoleon was more cunning. Kutuzov concentrated a significant part of the troops on the right flank, covering the New Smolensk road, which led to Moscow. The French began to storm the center and left flank. As a result, not receiving timely reinforcements, the Russian troops were forced to slowly retreat. There were moments when only the incredible heroism of soldiers and officers saved the Russian army from disaster. This was acknowledged by Napoleon himself.

KUTUZOV WITH AN EYE PATCH NEVER WALKED

The participants in the battle, commanders Nikolai Raevsky and Alexei Yermolov, recalled that Kutuzov did not actually lead the army during the battle.

This is their personal opinion. According to eyewitnesses, Kutuzov radiated confidence and calmness during the battle. He was not a one-eyed, decrepit old man, quietly sitting on a drum, as he is portrayed in Soviet films. By the way, he never wore an eye patch. This is a myth invented by filmmakers.

Two more episodes of the battle, which are considered legendary. Aleksey Yermolov, Chief of Staff of the First Army, urges the soldiers to attack, throwing St. George's Crosses forward. And General Raevsky goes into battle, holding the hands of the boys - sons.

These are also myths. They were both in the thick of the battle, holding themselves heroically. Perhaps that is why their names among the people are overgrown with many similar legends.

But there were also anti-heroes. Cossack Ataman Matvey Platov and General Fyodor Uvarov. Platov during the battle was pretty drunk and did not follow the order of the command.

Platov and Uvarov are the only ones among the highest ranks of the army who did not receive awards for the battle. In the midst of the battle, Kutuzov sent a combined detachment of Cossacks and hussars to raid the rear. But the attack quickly petered out. Kutuzov later wrote to Emperor Alexander that he "expected more from their actions." But still, this episode was very important. Napoleon had to postpone the assault on the already bloodless Russian positions in the center for two hours and managed to transfer reinforcements there.

And who can be called the main hero of the battle?

General Barclay de Tolly. A Russified Scot, he was terribly unpopular with the troops. Under his command, the army retreated from the border itself. He was called a traitor, booed. He clashed with Bagration and Kutuzov. But it was Barclay de Tolly who developed a successful method of fighting Napoleon - the scorched earth tactics, partisan detachments. Three horses were killed in the battle below him. Eyewitnesses said that he deliberately sought death. But didn't get a scratch.

SORRY IT'S NOT TRUE

Beautiful legend about Borodino bread

One of the heroes of the Battle of Borodino was Major General of the Russian army Alexander Tuchkov. During the battle, a bullet hit him in the chest. But the body of the general was never able to be taken out of the battlefield. Tuchkov left behind his beloved wife Margarita Naryshkina and a small son. According to legend, upon learning of her husband's death, Naryshkina went to the French and asked Napoleon for permission to go to the Borodino field to find her husband's remains. The French emperor was so touched by such loyalty that he even allocated soldiers to help her. But the expedition ended in vain. After the war, Naryshkina-Tuchkova erected a chapel on the Borodino field, and subsequently founded the Spaso-Borodino Monastery and became its abbess. A shelter for veterans, widows of fallen Russian soldiers and members of their families was also built there. All pilgrims who came to the monastery were given rye crackers baked according to a special recipe with the addition of malt, coriander or cumin on the way back. They say that for the first time such bread was baked by the general's widow herself.

Alas, but about bread - this is just a legend, - Alexander Valkovich told the KP correspondent. - Margarita Naryshkina, later Abbess Maria, really founded the Spaso-Borodino Monastery. But the recipe for Borodino bread was developed in 1933 at the Moscow Bakery Trust. Before the revolution, such recipes did not exist.

SIGNS

When Kutuzov first circled the Borodino field, an eagle appeared in the sky above him. This story was described by one of the participants in the battle, Boris Golitsyn:

“When Kutuzov surveyed the position near Borodino for the first time, it was after dinner, a gigantic eagle soared over him. Wherever he went, the eagle went there ... And there was no end to the rumors. This eagle foreshadowed all good things. In total, historians have found 17 written sources where this episode was mentioned.

In 1912, on the 100th anniversary of the battle, the French received permission to erect a monument to their dead soldiers on the Borodino field - an 8-meter pillar made of red granite with a laconic inscription "To the Dead of the Great Army." But the ship carrying the monument sank. A new monument was made and brought only a year later.

AT THE DAWN OF AVIATION

The French wanted to beat from the air

Immediately after the start of the war, the Moscow mayor Count Fyodor Rostopchin submitted a memorandum to Emperor Alexander with an unusual project of the German inventor Franz Leppich. He suggested putting soldiers on balloons. The most august person supported the idea. The first balloon began to be built in the estate of Rostopchin near Moscow. In August, a rumor spread around Moscow that a huge air apparatus was already ready, which could lift up to two thousand people. On September 3, Kutuzov wrote to Rostopchin: “The Sovereign Emperor told me about the erostat, which is secretly being prepared near Moscow, can it be used, please tell me, and how to use it more conveniently?” But it turned out that the first tests of the gondola, which could actually lift 40 people, were unsuccessful. When the French troops approached, the apparatus was dismantled and taken to Nizhny Novgorod in 130 carts, and then to St. Petersburg. His further fate is unknown.

HOW ARE THEM?

In France, Bonaparte won the school curriculum, but was no longer needed

Despite the lingering cult of Napoleon, the First Empire is now taught as an elective in high school. The Great Emperor and other monarchs were kicked out of the compulsory program for being "too aggressive". This is how the outcome of the Battle of Borodino is presented in the popular French textbook Histoire pour Tout le Monde - “History for All”.

“Night overtook the soldiers behind the bivouac, which they set up here, on the field, among mountains of corpses and agonizing comrades, as well as 15 thousand horses who fell in battle. Kutuzov took advantage of this respite to retreat in disorder and manage to pass off his stubborn resistance as a victory ... For the French side, the battle will be called the "battle of Moscow", after the name of the river where it took place. The battle ended with the undoubted victory of Napoleon, since after it he entered Moscow.

Oleg Shevtsov. Paris.

QUESTION OF THE DAY

And what is Borodino for you?

Alexander SHOKHIN, President of the Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs:

A symbol of a real impulse to defend the Fatherland, not lowered from above. The patriotic wave that rose in 1812 led to the unity of the elite with the people.

Vladimir DOLGIKH, State Duma deputy, ex-secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU:

This battle is an illustration of the fact that the spirit of the army can mean no less than artillery salvos! We must pray for this historic event and educate young patriots on it.

Alexander ZBRUEV, actor:

A great event that was completely wiped out. Turn on the iron - and there about the war of 1812 ... Friends, let's talk less on this topic and think more. Inwardly. Then we will understand what it means to us.

Peter TOLSTOY, TV presenter:

This is a battle in which my ancestors also participated, which I am very proud of. And this is an incredibly important event. Now, as then, society faces a serious threat of disintegration. It's time to focus and reflect.

Ilya REZNIK, poet:

My wife, Irina, was born in Fili, and the way to her house lay right through Borodino. She grew up on the street of the heroine of the war of 1812, Vasilisa Kozhina. No wonder my wife is a heroic woman!

Clara NOVIKOVA, artist:

How we miss today such high-flying personalities as the soldiers on the Borodino field were.

Vyacheslav, listener of radio "KP":

Place. I have been going there since 1971. There is even "my" oak, which I remember when I was little. The whole air is saturated with something special, there is some goodness there.

Elena, a reader of the site KP.RU:

Ice cream, favorite since childhood! But seriously, I associate the word "Borodino" more often not with a great battle, but with the name of Lermontov, who described the battle in wonderful poems.

Myths about the Battle of Borodino

"Excellent" position near the village of Borodino

F.N. Glinka in his "Letters of a Russian officer" says:

“How easy it is to please a soldier! You must show only him that you care about his fate, that you delve into his condition, that you demand from him what is necessary and nothing superfluous. When the Most Serene Prince went around the regiments for the first time, the soldiers began to fuss, began to clear, stretch and line up. "No need! None of this is needed! - said the prince. - I came only to see if you are healthy, my children! A soldier on a campaign does not think about panache: he needs to rest after work and prepare for victory. On another occasion, seeing that some general’s convoy was hindering the march of the regiments, he immediately ordered the road to be cleared and said loudly: “Every step of the road is dear to a soldier on a campaign, as soon as he comes, he will have more rest!” Such words of the commander-in-chief filled the entire army with power of attorney and love for him. “That’s what our “father” came to, the soldiers said, “he knows all our needs: how not to fight with him”<…>

It is said that the last time the Serene Highness inspected the shelves, an eagle appeared in the air and hovered over it. The prince bared his adorned head with gray hair; the whole army shouted "ypa!". On the same day, the commander-in-chief ordered to serve in all regiments the prayer service of the Smolensk Mother of God and for her icon, which was with the army, to make a new decent kivot. All this delights soldiers and everyone!

Sounds beautiful, touching, patriotic…

Nevertheless, having taken command of the united Russian army, M.I. Kutuzov, from whom everyone expected a decisive change in the course of the war, ordered ... to continue the retreat.

"The position in which I stopped at the village of Borodino<…>one of the best, which can only be found on flat places.

In fact, such a statement looks as strange as the location of the Russian troops.

It, to put it mildly, looks rather strange: the main part of the army stood on the right flank, on the banks of the Kolocha River, and was practically useless in this place, since there was no one against it, on the other side of the river. At the same time, Napoleon concentrated his main forces in the center and on his right flank, that is, much south of the village of Borodino, where the Russian troops had relatively few.

British observer General Robert Wilson relates:

“The ubiquitous Kolotsky stream, flowing through a deep ravine, covered the front of the right flank and part of the center to the very village of Borodino.

The left flank began at the hills above Borodino, behind the village of Semenovsky, in a more open area, but crossed by deep ravines and thickets of shrubs, which made it difficult to advance in close formation.

To the right of the position, near the forest, earthen fortifications were built.

On the hills in front of Gorki - in the right center of the position - there were two heavily fortified redoubts that dominated Borodino, Kolocha and the large, so-called New Smolenskaya road, which, passing through Borodino, Gorki and the center of the army, led to Mozhaisk. Four hundred yards from the Gorki battery, another battery was advanced, with 1,200 men.

The weakest was the left flank - a bastioned battery with curtains, located on the heights in front of the plain. This battery connected the center and the left flank.

The village of Semenovskoye, located in front of the front of the left flank, was burned in order to prevent the enemy from gaining a foothold in it. Here it was supposed to build a strong redoubt, but this fortification remained only barely outlined.

In front of the ruins of the village, there was a deep ravine, behind which there were flashes, or redans, designed to support the advanced rangers, and near the village of Shevardino, on a hill between two copses, there was another fortification to protect the village of Semenovsky.

The location of the troops before the Battle of Borodino

General L.L. Bennigsen does not try to hide his indignation. He's writing:

“Look at the plan for this battle. Note first of all the vast space which our troops occupied (this was the greatest mistake that could be made in anticipation of an attack from Napoleon, whose system of operations is well known and against which more effective measures could therefore be taken.<…>). From the last battery on our right flank to the last battery on the left flank, or to the 3rd Corps, which was under the command of Lieutenant General Tuchkov, who stood on the Old Smolensk road, there were more than ten miles, so that the troops, or reserves, located on one flank, or even in the center, could not come up in time to support the other wing - which happened on August 26, despite the fact that the enemy had already indicated on August 24 (September 5) the intention to attack our left flank. I expressed my opinion to Prince Kutuzov, but everything remained as before.

But the opinion of General A.P. Yermolov:

“The weakness of the left wing in comparison with other parts of the position was palpable, while the fortifications on it were negligible, and in the shortness of time it was impossible to make them better.”

Having examined the Russian positions two days before the battle, Prince Bagration wrote to F.V. Rostopchin:

“We all choose places and find worse and worse.”

They say that this unfortunate position was not even chosen by M.I. Kutuzov, and Colonel K.F. Toll, appointed by the commander-in-chief to the post of quartermaster general.

In any case, General L.L. Bennigsen, in his Notes, states that "Colonel Tol mastered the mind of Prince Kutuzov, whom his obesity did not allow him to carry out reconnaissance of the area either before the battle or after it."

The conclusion is made by the chief quartermaster of the 6th corps I.P. Liprandi:

“As for a position in a general sense, then describe it in detail and calculate its disadvantages and advantages<…>it would be redundant. I will only note one thing, that in the entire space from Tsarev Zaimishch, where Kutuzov arrived, to Moscow there was not a single position that, after all the shortcomings attributed to Borodino, would be better for us. And to give the battle to Moscow, for the reasons of the commander in chief, it was necessary.

Nevertheless, in his report to Emperor M.B. Barclay de Tolly reported:

“We finally arrived on August 22 in a position at Borodino. It was advantageous in the center and right flank, but the left wing<…>was absolutely not supported by anything and was surrounded by bushes at a distance of a rifle shot.

But Mikhail Illarionovich was not at all embarrassed by all this. He assured Emperor Alexander:

“The weak point of this position, which is on the left flank, I will try to correct with art.”

How he succeeds, we'll see...

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The battle of Borodino in 1812 is a battle that lasted only one day, but has been preserved in the history of the planet among the most important world events. Napoleon took this blow, hoping to quickly conquer the Russian Empire, but his plans were not destined to come true. It is believed that it was the Battle of Borodino that became the first stage in the fall of the famous conqueror. What is known about the battle, which Lermontov glorified in his famous work?

Battle of Borodino 1812: prehistory

It was a time when Bonaparte's troops had already managed to subjugate almost all of continental Europe, the emperor's power even extended to Africa. He himself emphasized in conversations with those close to him that in order to gain world domination, he only had to acquire control over Russian lands.

To conquer Russian territory, he gathered an army, the number of which was approximately 600 thousand people. The army was rapidly advancing deep into the state. However, Napoleon's soldiers, one after another, died under the blow of the peasant militias, their health worsened due to the unusually difficult climate and poor nutrition. Nevertheless, the advance of the troops continued, the goal of the French was the capital.

The bloody battle of Borodino in 1812 became part of the tactics used by the Russian generals. They weakened the enemy army with minor battles, waiting for the time for a decisive blow.

Main steps

The battle of Borodino in 1812 was actually a chain consisting of several clashes with the French troops, which resulted in huge losses on both sides. The first was the battle for the village of Borodino, which is located about 125 km from Moscow. On the part of Russia, de Tolly participated in it, on the part of the enemy, the Beauharnais corps.

The Battle of Borodino in 1812 was in full swing when the battle took place. It involved 15 divisions of French marshals and two Russians, led by Vorontsov and Neverovsky. At this stage, Bagration received a severe wound, which forced him to entrust command to Konovnitsyn.

By the time the Russian soldiers left the fleches, the Battle of Borodino (1812) had been going on for about 14 hours. A brief summary of further events: the Russians are located behind the Semenovsky ravine, where the third battle takes place. Its participants are the people who attacked the flushes and defended them. The French received reinforcements, which was the cavalry, under the leadership of Nansouty. Uvarov's cavalry hurried to help the Russian troops, and the Cossacks under the command of Platov also approached.

Raevsky battery

Separately, it is worth considering the final stage of such an event as the Battle of Borodino (1812). Summary: the battles for what went down in history as the "grave of the French cavalry" lasted about 7 hours. This place really became a grave for many soldiers of Bonaparte.

Historians are still puzzled as to why the forces of the Russian army abandoned the Shevadinsky redoubt. It is possible that the commander-in-chief deliberately opened the left flank in order to divert the attention of the enemy from the right. His goal was to protect the new Smolensk road, using which Napoleon's army would quickly approach Moscow.

Many documents important for history have been preserved that shed light on such an event as the war of 1812. The Battle of Borodino is mentioned in a letter that Kutuzov sent to the Russian emperor even before it began. The commander informed the tsar that the terrain features (open fields) would provide the Russian troops with optimal positions.

Hundred per minute

The battle of Borodino (1812) is briefly and extensively covered in so many historical sources that it seems that it was very long in time. In fact, the battle, which began on September 7 at half past five in the morning, lasted less than a day. Of course, it turned out to be among the bloodiest of all the short battles.

It's no secret how many lives the Battle of Borodino claimed and made its bloody contribution. Historians failed to establish the exact number of those killed, they call 80-100 thousand dead on both sides. The calculation shows that at least a hundred soldiers were sent to the next world every minute.

Heroes

The Patriotic War of 1812 gave well-deserved fame to many commanders. The Battle of Borodino, of course, immortalized such a person as Kutuzov. By the way, Mikhail Illarionovich at that time was not yet a gray-haired old man who did not open one eye. At the time of the battle, he was still an energetic, albeit aging man, and did not wear his signature armband.

Of course, Kutuzov was not the only hero who glorified Borodino. Together with him, Bagration, Raevsky, de Tolly entered history. It is interesting that the last of them did not enjoy authority in the troops, although he was the author of a brilliant idea to put partisan forces against the enemy army. According to the legend, during the Battle of Borodino, the general lost his horses three times, which died under a barrage of shells and bullets, but he himself remained unharmed.

Who has the victory

Perhaps this question remains the main intrigue of the bloody battle, since both sides participating in it have their own opinions on this matter. French historians are convinced that Napoleon's troops won a great victory that day. Russian scientists insist on the opposite, their theory was once supported by Alexander the First, who proclaimed the Battle of Borodino an absolute victory for Russia. By the way, it was after him that Kutuzov was awarded the rank of Field Marshal.

It is known that Bonaparte was not satisfied with the reports provided by his military leaders. The number of guns recaptured from the Russians turned out to be minimal, as well as the number of prisoners whom the retreating army took with them. It is believed that the conqueror was finally crushed by the enemy's morale.

The large-scale battle that began on September 7 near the village of Borodino inspired writers, poets, artists, and then directors who covered it in their works for two centuries. One can also recall the painting “The Hussar Ballad”, and the famous creation of Lermontov, which is now taught at school.

What was the Battle of Borodino in 1812 really like and how did it turn out for the Russians and the French? Buntman, Eidelman - historians who created a concise and accurate text covering the bloody battle in detail. Critics praise this work for its impeccable knowledge of the era, vivid images of the heroes of the battle (on both sides), thanks to which all events are easy to imagine in the imagination. This book is a must read for those who are seriously interested in history and military affairs.