In the city of Korsun-Shevchenkovsky, the Museum of the History of the Battle of Korsun-Shevchenkovsky was opened, in the places of the most fierce battles - the monuments that made up the Korsun-Shevchenkovsky memorial complex.
The Korsun-Shevchenkovsky operation is an outstanding operation to encircle and destroy a large enemy grouping, prepared in a short time and carried out in difficult meteorological conditions. It showed that the Red Army had completely mastered the highest form of operational art - the art of encircling and destroying the enemy.
The film tells about one of the brilliant operations of the Great Patriotic War, carried out by the Soviet command in early 1944 - the famous battle of Korsun-Shevchenkovsky, after the victory in which the exit to the Balkans was opened for the Soviet Army.
Participants of the Korsun-Shevchenko battle during the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945. Ukrainian SSR. Cherkasy region. Lysyansky district. The village of Pochapitsy.
To perpetuate the victory of the Soviet troops, the Council of People's Commissars of Ukraine in July 1945 adopted a Resolution on the opening of a historical museum.
The museum opened in the former Lopukhin-Demidov Palace, an architectural monument of the 18th and 19th centuries. Currently, the Museum of the History of the Battle of Korsun-Shevchenko occupies the entire first floor of the former palace. Documents, photographs, weapons, awards, uniforms and equipment of the belligerents are placed in its halls, telling about the beginning of World War II, the occupation regime in the Korsun region, the crossing of the Dnieper, the beginning and course of the Korsun-Shevchenko operation, the surrender of Germany and the Victory in Red Square. Most of the museum's materials are devoted to the Korsun-Shevchenko events.
A diorama "Korsun-Shevchenkovsky battle of 1944" was arranged in a separate room, 4.4 meters high, 14 meters long. Among the exhibits of the museum you can see the uniform of Marshal I. Konev, as well as the personal belongings of the German Lieutenant General V. Stemmermann.
According to local residents, it was in this place that the encirclement of the Germans during the Korsun-Shevchenko operation ended.
Marshal of the Soviet Union I.S. Konevv wrote: On January 29, the cavalry corps entered the gap. In the future, he played a positive role in the encirclement of the enemy and in the fighting on the inner front of the encirclement. Here, looking ahead, I would like to say that the Cossacks distinguished themselves with might and main when the enemy tried to get out of the encirclement.
Perhaps this was one of the rare cases in the entire war, when the cavalry acted openly in the cavalry and boldly cut down the enemy.
The Don Cossacks in this complex and difficult operation did not disgrace their former glory of the young Donets and wrote another bright page in the history of the Great Patriotic War. For this, many, many thanks to them, and eternal glory to Commander General Selivanov!
A monument was built to commemorate the encirclement and defeat of the enemy in the Korsun-Shevchenkovsky ring in the village of Steblevo, Korsun-Shevchenkovsky district, Cherkasy region. A stele is installed on a concrete pedestal (length 14.8 m, height 1.8 m). 13 granite slabs were laid on it, on which the names of 23 military units and formations were engraved, which received the honorary name Korsunsky.
Nearby is a reinforced concrete ring with a diameter of 7 meters, symbolizing the encirclement ring of the enemy group. On it is the inscription: "Glory to the Soviet Army!".
Korsun - Shevchenko operation of 1944
Colonel Sergei GREBENIUK,
head of the history of World War II
Institute of Military History of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation,
Candidate of Historical Sciences
KORSUN-SHEVCHENKOVSKAYA FRONT OFFENSIVE OPERATION was carried out by the troops of the 1st and 2nd Ukrainian fronts from January 24 to February 17, 1944 in order to destroy a large enemy grouping and was part of the strategic offensive of the Soviet troops in Right-Bank Ukraine. The Korsun-Shevchenkovsky operation had a large spatial scope and involved a significant number of troops and equipment on both sides. About 26 divisions, including nine armored divisions, large aviation forces, and a lot of artillery, participated on the external and internal fronts from the enemy's side. This entire group of Nazis during the fighting was almost completely defeated by the Soviet troops.
By mid-January 1944, as a result of the successful implementation of the Zhytomyr-Berdichev operation, the troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front (commander - General of the Army N.F. Vatutin) reached the area of the city of Sarny on the outskirts of Shepetovka and Vinnitsa.
N.F. Vatutin
The troops of the 2nd Ukrainian Front (General of the Army I.S. Konev) captured a large bridgehead west and northwest of the city of Dnepropetrovsk and, after the Kirovograd offensive operation, threw the enemy back from the Dnieper by more than 100 km, reaching the line of Smila, Balandino, west of Kirovograd and Novgorodka. At the same time, the troops of the 3rd Ukrainian Front (General of the Army R.Ya. Malinovsky), having liberated Zaporozhye, advanced from the Dnieper to the west up to 400 km. However, in the area of the city of Kanev, the enemy managed to hold out.
I.S. Konev
Korsun-Shevchenkovsky ledge
As a result, the so-called Korsun-Shevchenkovsky ledge was formed, which the Wehrmacht command sought to keep at all costs. It was obvious that the Nazi command expected to use this ledge as a springboard for an offensive in order to restore the front line along the western bank of the Dnieper. Hitler's headquarters hoped that in connection with the beginning of the spring thaw, the Soviet troops would not be able to advance at a high pace, so they expected to get a respite in the southern sector of their eastern front.
Hitler understood that the loss of the Right-Bank Ukraine would break the entire strategic front of the German troops.
Under these conditions, the enemy was in a hurry to create a stable defense in the area of the Korsun-Shevchenko salient.
The Nazis created the strongest defense with a developed system of engineering structures and various kinds of barriers in the Kagarlyk-Moshny sector. On the Moshna, Smela sector, the front line of the enemy defense passed through heavily swampy terrain. Therefore, the defense here consisted of separate strongholds intercepting the main roads. South of Smila, the German defense consisted of two lanes. Its front edge ran along the river bank. Tyasmin and heights. The main strip included strongholds and nodes of resistance, connected in places by trenches. Inside the strongholds there was a developed system of trenches and communications, a significant number of wood-and-earth firing points. Strongholds and centers of resistance from the front and flanks were covered by minefields and barbed wire.
The second line of defense was equipped at the turn of Tashlyk, Pastorskoe, Tishkovka, but its construction was not completed by the beginning of the offensive of the Soviet troops. Along the river Olshanka, on the Mleev, Topilno section, a cut-off position was passing with the front to the southeast. In the sector south of Ol'shany, the enemy's defense was less developed in terms of engineering. The enemy retreated to this line only on January 10-12, 1944, and therefore did not have time to strengthen it sufficiently. There were a number of strongholds, the gaps between which were covered with barriers. In the forests, the enemy made blockages and notches, mined them with anti-tank and anti-personnel mines.
In total, the enemy defense had a depth of 6-8 km and was built on holding strongholds and centers of resistance, interconnected by fire and in places connected by trenches. The low defense equipment in engineering terms was compensated by reliance on dense machine-gun and artillery fire. The strongest defense was in the northern part of the ledge, and the weakest was against the troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front in the sector from Koshevatoe to the lower base of the ledge and against the troops of the 2nd Ukrainian Front in the sector south of Raigorod.
Enemy forces
Nine infantry and tank divisions defended directly on the ledge (the average number of infantry divisions was 8500 people), a motorized brigade, a tank battalion, six assault gun battalions, artillery and engineering units belonging to the 1st tank and 8th field armies of the enemy. The grouping consisted of 1640 guns and mortars, 140 tanks and assault guns. All these troops were mainly in the first echelon. The enemy did not have strong reserves on the ledge. However, in the area north of Uman and west of Kirovograd, he had up to eight tank divisions, which in a short time could be transferred to the directions of the offensive of the Soviet troops.
German tanksT-
VI" Tiger "
"Surround and Destroy!"
On January 12, 1944, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command assigned the troops of the 1st and 2nd Ukrainian Fronts the task of encircling and destroying the enemy grouping in the Korsun-Shevchenkovsky ledge by delivering strikes under its base. To assist in the encirclement and destruction of the enemy's Korsun-Shevchenko grouping, the Headquarters demanded that the main efforts of the aviation of both fronts be directed.
The troops of the left wing of the 1st Ukrainian Front and the right wing of the 2nd Ukrainian Front, which were against the enemy grouping on the ledge, included 27 rifle divisions and two fortified areas, 3979 guns and mortars, 376 tanks and self-propelled artillery installations (ACS ). The average strength of a rifle division was 4,700 men. The 2nd Panzer Army (372 tanks and self-propelled guns) was in the reserve of the commander of the 1st Ukrainian Front in the area of Belaya Tserkov. In addition, on January 20, 1944, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command issued a directive on the formation of the 6th Tank Army as part of the 5th Guards (Guards) Tank and 5th Mechanized Corps. Connections of the 5th Guards. tank corps took part in the battles until January 20, and the formations of the 5th mechanized corps were in formation, after which they were concentrated in the 40th army zone at a distance of 4-8 km from the front line.
In the reserve of the 2nd Ukrainian Front in the Kirovograd area was the 5th Guards. tank army, and in the Znamenka area - the 5th Guards. cavalry corps.
The ratio of forces on the ledge was as follows: for infantry - 1.7: 1, for artillery - 2.4: 1, for tanks and self-propelled artillery installations - 2.7: 1 in favor of the Soviet troops.
In order to prevent the enemy from strengthening his defensive positions and strengthening the grouping of troops, the Soviet command had to begin the liquidation of the Korsun-Shevchenkovsky ledge as quickly as possible. This forced the preparation of the operation in a short time. The fronts had to carry out a large regrouping of troops under difficult conditions. The main forces, including the 5th Guards Tank Army, operating on the left wing of the 2nd Ukrainian Front in the Kirovograd region, where the fighting had just ended, had to be secretly and quickly transferred to the north and prepared for a strike.
Weather and terrain conditions for the preparation of the operation were extremely unfavorable. The sudden thaw and, in connection with it, the mudslide complicated the movement of troops and the supply of fuel and ammunition, which, first of all, hampered the maneuver of the troops (from January 27 to February 18, it rained and sleet for 10 days, and snow on the rest. Only five days were without precipitation.
The average daily temperature ranged from -5 to +5C°).
The 1st Ukrainian Front was supposed to break through the enemy defenses in the Tynovka, Koshevatoe sector, inflicting the main blow with the troops of the adjacent flanks of the 40th and 27th armies, as well as the 6th tank army in the general direction of Zvenigorodka, by the end of the third day of the operation, leave to the line of Zvenigorodka, Lisyanka and connect with the troops of the 2nd Ukrainian Front.
G.K. Zhukov, K. Bogomolov, N.F. Vatutin (left - right)
The commander of the 1st Ukrainian Front created a strike force consisting of six rifle divisions and one tank army and provided for two strikes: on Zvenigorodka and on Boguslav. On the main (Zvenigorod) direction, the 6th Tank Army and the rifle formations of the 40th Army were to first break through the enemy defenses, and then develop the offensive and depth, and, joining with the troops of the 2nd Ukrainian Front, create an external encirclement front. On the Korsun-Shevchenkovsky direction, the rifle formations of the 27th Army, having joined with the rifle troops of the 2nd Ukrainian Front, were supposed to form an internal encirclement front. It should be noted that the strike force of the 1st Ukrainian Front had to be created in a difficult situation, since the troops of the front fought fierce battles, repelling the blows of the enemy advancing from the Vinnitsa and Uman region. This explains why six rifle divisions were initially allocated to the strike force for the Korsun-Shevchenkovsky operation, and then during the battle these forces were built up.
The 2nd Ukrainian Front was supposed to break through the enemy defenses with the troops of the adjacent flanks of the 4th Guards. and the 53rd Army in the Verbovka, Vasylivka sector (width -19 km) and, inflicting the main blow in the direction of Ositnyazhka, Shpola, Zvenigorodka, connect with the troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front and complete the encirclement of the Korsun-Shevchenko enemy grouping.
P.A. Rotmistrov, I.S. Konev
The decision of the commander of the 2nd Ukrainian Front provided for the creation of a strike force consisting of 14 rifle divisions and three tank corps. Connections of the 4th Guards. and the 52nd armies, after breaking through the enemy’s defenses, were to develop an offensive in depth and, together with the troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front, create an internal encirclement front, and formations of the 53rd and 5th Guards. tank armies - to strike at Zvenigorodka and, together with the troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front, form an external encirclement front.
Thus, the general plan of the Soviet command was to deliver strong blows from two fronts in converging directions in order to encircle and destroy the enemy. Strikes were planned under the base of the ledge, at the weakest points in the enemy's defense and in directions favorable to his encirclement. The leading role in achieving high rates was assigned to tank armies. The main forces were intended to create an external front of encirclement. 13 rifle divisions were allocated to the inner front of the encirclement, and 14 rifle divisions, two tank armies and most of the artillery were allocated to the outer front, which fully corresponded to the situation in which large enemy counterattacks could be expected on the outer front.
The beginning of the offensive was determined: January 26 for the 1st Ukrainian Front, January 25 for the 2nd Ukrainian Front. The difference in terms was due to the difference in the distances that the shock groups of the fronts had to overcome to Zvenigorodka, that is, to the point where they were supposed to connect.
The preparation of the operation was carried out within a limited time frame and took place in a tense atmosphere of ongoing hostilities, especially on the 1st Ukrainian Front.
In order to achieve surprise during the regrouping of troops in the direction of the main attack, the most stringent measures were taken for operational camouflage and disinformation. For example, false areas of concentration of tanks and artillery were created, false firing positions were created, false movements of troops and equipment were simulated. All this taken together greatly contributed to the success of the operation.
First - reconnaissance in battle
The beginning of the operation was preceded by reconnaissance in force. It was carried out one or two days before the offensive and made it possible to clarify the enemy's grouping and his defense system. The offensive of the troops of the 2nd Ukrainian Front began with the actions of reinforced forward battalions of the 4th Guards. and 53rd Army on the night of January 24th. Having the task of establishing the true front line of the enemy's defense, these battalions went over to the offensive after a short fire artillery and mortar raid. An unexpected attack for the enemy brought success.
On January 24, near Kirovograd, units of the 5th Guards went on the offensive. and 7th Guards. armies, who had the task of diverting the attention of the enemy from the Zvenigorod direction.
In connection with the successful reconnaissance of the battle, the front command believed that the enemy was not in a position to offer serious resistance to our troops. Therefore, artillery preparation for an attack in the direction of the main attack on the front of the entire strike force was reduced from 54 to 10 minutes.
In addition, the starting positions of the 5th Guards. of the tank army were brought closer to the combat formations of the infantry by 4-5 km and were occupied on the night of January 24-25.
January 25 at 07:46, after a 10-minute artillery preparation, the main forces of the 4th Guards. and the 53rd armies went on the offensive and began to slowly move forward. The enemy, not being sufficiently suppressed during the period of short artillery preparation, tried to resist with the fire of his artillery and counterattacks of small groups of infantry and tanks, but was forced to retreat under the blows of our troops.
To speed up the breakthrough, the commander of the 5th Guards. the tank army brought its first echelon into battle from the line of Kakhanivka, Burtki at a depth of 4-5 km from the front line along three routes: the 20th corps was introduced along two routes, and the 29th - one at a time.
As a result of joint battles between infantry and tanks, by 10 a.m., the enemy's main line of defense was broken through on the front of the 53rd Army. However, our troops failed to develop an offensive in depth at high rates, since as they advanced, enemy resistance increased. He put up especially great resistance in the settlement. Ositnyazhka, as well as in the forest west of Reimmentarovka and at an altitude of 215.9.
The actions of Soviet aviation during this period proceeded in exceptionally unfavorable conditions: all airfields of the 5th Air Army were covered with fog, which made it very difficult for aircraft to take off and land and made it difficult to support ground forces during the breakthrough.
Despite this, the troops stubbornly moved forward. During the day, they covered 9-12 km, having mastered the settlement. Ositnyazhka and Pisarevka and going out to Tishkovka and Kapitonovka.
Continuing hostilities at night, formations of the 20th and 29th tank and 26th guards. rifle corps by the morning took possession of these settlements.
Thus, the enemy defense was broken through by the troops of the shock group of the 2nd Ukrainian Front on the very first day of the offensive. On the morning of January 26, favorable conditions were created for the transition of the tank corps to the pursuit of the enemy.
Developing the offensive in the direction of Zvenigorodka, the 20th Panzer Corps liberated the city of Shpola on January 27, where it captured rich trophies, including a depot with a large supply of fuel. Having concentrated the main forces in Shpol and refueled the vehicles, the corps continued the offensive and on January 28, with the forces of the 155th, 8th Guards. and the 80th Tank Brigade, attacking from the east, southeast and south, broke into Zvenigorodka On the river. Rotten Tikich in the city center soldiers of the 155th brigade of the 5th guards. tank army united with units and subunits of the 233rd brigade of the 6th tank army.
By this time, the 29th Panzer Corps, developing the offensive, reached the line of Skotarevo, Tolmach, and the second echelon of the 5th Guards. tank army - the 18th tank corps - was brought into battle and repelled enemy counterattacks in the Zlatopol region. Troops of the 4th Guards. and the 53rd Army by January 28 expanded the breakthrough to 35 km and advanced to a depth of 22 km.
The enemy counterattacks
In an effort to eliminate the breakthrough and prevent the development of our offensive, the enemy began to launch counterattacks under the base of the formed ledge. By January 27, these counterattacks developed into counterattacks, for which the enemy transferred the 11th and 14th tank divisions from the Kirovograd region. At the same time, units of the Viking SS Panzer Division, the 57th Division and the remnants of the defeated units of the 389th Infantry Division went on the offensive. They struck in the direction of Ositnyazhka from the north. Enemy counterattacks were supported by large aviation forces.
As a result of fierce fighting, the enemy managed to capture Kapitonovka and Tishkovka and cut off the main forces of the 20th and 29th tank corps from their headquarters and from the main forces of the front. Initially, the communications headquarters of the 5th Guards. tank army and the 20th tank corps with brigades was supported by radio. But on the morning of January 28, due to the large detachment of troops, radio communications also failed to work. All attempts by headquarters to break through to the troops failed.
In this difficult situation, the commander showed useful initiative and great resourcefulness.
8th Guards tank brigade Colonel V.F. Orlov.
He took over the command of all four brigades, ensuring the completion of the task of capturing Zvenigorodka. Having organized the all-round defense of the city, Colonel Orlov began to seek to establish contact with senior commanders, for which he sent a communications officer to the 18th Tank Corps, and also reported the situation to the headquarters of the 5th Guards. tank army, using for this the radio communications of the 1st Ukrainian Front. Thanks to the measures taken, command and control of the troops was not lost.
Simultaneously with the development of success, the troops of the shock group of the 2nd Ukrainian Front conducted combat operations to clear the settlement from the enemy. Kapitonovka and Tishkovka and to clear the roads leading to Zvenigorodka. The fighting was fierce. These settlements changed hands several times. Only on January 30, when the enemy was finally driven back and the resulting corridor cleared, did the corps headquarters get the opportunity to pass to the troops in the Zvenigorodka area. By the morning of January 31, the headquarters of the 20th Panzer Corps, together with the corps and 32 T-34 tanks received by that time for replenishment, entered the defense lines of their brigades. In the period from January 31 to February 3, the enemy tried to break through to his encircled troops, for which the forces of the 3rd and 13th Panzer Divisions delivered a counterattack in the direction of Skotarevo, Shpola.
The outer front of the encirclement
In order to create an external encirclement front and repel all enemy attacks, the front commander assigned the task of defending the Zvenigorodka-Vodyanoye line to the 5th Guards. tank army, reinforcing it with the 49th rifle corps (three rifle divisions). To the left of it, the 53rd Army took up defense. The front and army mobile obstacle detachments hastily created anti-tank and anti-personnel minefields on the paths of movement of enemy troops. Only on the night of January 29, 9454 anti-tank and 1014 anti-personnel mines were laid at the Reymeytarovka-Tishkovka line. Destroyed and serviceable tanks dug in, field and anti-tank artillery were brought up. Thus, by February 3, a solid defense was created on the sector of the outer front of the encirclement of the 2nd Ukrainian Front.
To speed up the formation of a section of the inner front of the encirclement, on the night of January 30, the front commander brought his reserve into battle - the 5th Guards. cavalry corps from the line of Zhurovka, Turiya at the front of 5 km. The entry was carried out in adverse conditions: under the influence of artillery and machine-gun fire of the enemy and under the blows of his aircraft. Despite this, on January 31, the formations of the corps went to the Burta area, where they connected with the left-flank units of the 4th Guards. army, and in the Olshan area met with units of the 27th Army of the 1st Ukrainian Front. Thanks to this, the inner front of the encirclement was also closed. In the same period, in connection with the improvement of the weather, the actions of our aviation became more active. From January 29 to February 3, fighter aviation of the 5th Air Army participated in 102 air battles, shooting down 94 enemy aircraft in the process.
1st Ukrainian is coming
The offensive of the troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front began on January 26 at 09:40 after a 35-minute artillery preparation. Aviation, due to unfavorable meteorological conditions, almost did not operate that day.
In the offensive zone of the strike force of the 40th Army, the advance on the first day did not exceed 2-3 km. Parts of the enemy's 34th and 198th infantry divisions, weakly suppressed during the artillery preparation period, put up stubborn resistance. The strike force of the 27th Army achieved much greater success, advancing 10-11 km. This success was due to the fact that the main forces of the 198th Infantry Division, which opposed it, were pinned down in the zone of the 40th Army.
The commander of the 6th Tank Army, seeking to use the success of the 27th Army, decided to bring his reserve into battle - the 233rd Tank Brigade. The brigade was reinforced by the 5th mechanized corps with one motorized rifle battalion and the 1228th self-propelled artillery regiment. She was given the task of advancing to the Lisyanka area, after which the main forces attacked Zvenigorodka. The formed group was headed by the deputy corps commander, Major General of the Tank Forces M.I. Saveliev.
By 10 a.m. on January 27, the group entered the zone of the 180th Infantry Division and, having gone on the offensive two hours later, advanced to a depth of 12 km during the day of the battle. On the night of January 28, she went to the settlement. Li-syanka, bypassed it from the east and west, suddenly attacked and defeated the garrison located there with a force up to an infantry battalion and captured this point. Subsequently, without encountering strong resistance, the group advanced 22 km and at 11 a.m. on January 28 reached the northern and western outskirts of Zvenigorodka. In a short battle, the enemy who was here was defeated. Parts of the 233rd tank brigade captured the bridge across the river. Rotten Tikich, and by 12 o’clock in the city center, as already indicated, they connected with units of the 155th brigade of the 5th guards. Panzer Army of the 2nd Ukrainian Front.
Formations of the 27th Army during January 27 and 28 advanced 16-20 km in the direction of the main attack, and in the auxiliary directions, the forces of the 159th and 54th fortified regions, as well as the 206th rifle division, slowly pressed the enemy and advanced to depth up to 5 km. Continuing to advance, on January 31 they reached the settlement. Olshana, where the 180th Infantry Division joined up with the 63rd Cavalry Division of the 5th Guards. Cavalry Corps of the 2nd Ukrainian Front.
The advance of the troops of the 40th and 6th tank armies was less successful, since the enemy offered them stubborn resistance, and on the right flank of the 40th army even managed to push the troops to the north.
Feeling the threat of encirclement, the fascist German command began to transfer units of the 43rd Army Corps and the 16th Panzer Division to the flanks of the breakthrough in order to stop the offensive of our troops. But, despite the resistance of the enemy, the shock grouping of the front continued its offensive during January 28 and achieved decisive success.
The 6th Panzer Army, having regrouped the 5th Guards. tank corps from the right flank into the zone of the 47th rifle corps, struck in the direction of Tikhonovka, freed our grouping, which was surrounded there, after which the 5th Guards. the tank corps took up defense on the outer front, and the 5th mechanized corps was temporarily transferred to the command of the commander of the 40th army in connection with the need to strengthen its defense on the right flank. On February 3, this corps returned to the command of the commander of the 6th Panzer Army.
By February 3, formations of the 40th and 6th tank armies formed a section of the outer front of the encirclement, which adjoined the section of the troops of the 2nd Ukrainian Front. The troops of the 27th Army by that time had created a section of the internal front of the encirclement, joining the section of the internal front created by the troops of the 52nd and 4th Guards. armies of the 1st Ukrainian Front.
Surrounded by over 80,000
Thus, by February 3, 1944, the Soviet troops completed the formation of continuous internal and external encirclement fronts. Nine infantry and tank divisions, a motorized brigade, the headquarters of the 11th and 42nd army corps of the 1st tank and 8th field armies, and a number of enemy reinforcement units were surrounded. The encircled enemy group numbered more than 80 thousand soldiers and officers.
Our aviation played an important role in encircling the enemy. From January 29 to February 3, the 5th Air Army made 1,708 sorties. Enemy aviation during this time made only 727 sorties in the zone of the 2nd Ukrainian Front.
Characteristic in the formation of the outer front of the encirclement was that it was created first by mobile troops, followed by combined arms formations. Moreover, our troops had to repel strong enemy counterattacks, which developed into counterattacks. This was the reason why a solid external front was created much later, after the mobile troops had joined forces in the Zvenigorodka area.
The distance between the outer and inner fronts of the encirclement in some areas did not exceed 15-30 km, and, consequently, the threat of the release of the enemy grouping was quite real. In this regard, along with the organization of a solid defense on the external front, it was necessary to take decisive measures to eliminate the encircled enemy.
By February 4, on the outer front of the encirclement, the 40th Army, 6th and 5th Guards took up the defense. tank armies, reinforced respectively by the 47th and 49th rifle corps, and the 53rd army. At that time, the 27th, 52nd and 4th Guards operated on the home front. army and 5th Guards. cavalry corps.
By this time, the enemy had created two groupings here, consisting of eight tank and seven infantry divisions, and from February 3 to 8 launched two strong counterattacks, hoping to break through to his troops and withdraw them from the encirclement.
As a result of a counterattack inflicted from the Rubanny Bridge area in the direction of Lisyanka, the enemy managed to penetrate the defenses of the 104th Rifle Corps of the 40th Army for 25 km, but its further advance was stopped. In this direction, in a short time, the 32nd anti-tank brigade, the 2nd tank army, which made a 100-kilometer march in the conditions of mud and went into battle, as well as three rifle divisions, were advanced from the front reserve in a short time. The enemy, having suffered heavy losses, on February 8 went over to the defensive and began regrouping his forces and means to transfer the blow to the zone of the 6th Panzer Army.
The second counterattack was delivered by the enemy at the junction of the 5th Guards. tank and 53rd armies in the direction of Lebedin by the forces of the 3rd, 11th, 13th and 14th tank divisions (up to 200 armored units) with the support of more than 100 aircraft. Our troops repulsed this blow as well.
The enemy is resisting...
On February 8, the Soviet command issued an ultimatum to the encircled troops, proposing to stop resistance in order to avoid unnecessary bloodshed. However, the enemy rejected this humane proposal. Therefore, from February 9, the blows of our troops against the enemy increased sharply. The enemy grouping was shrinking more and more, and its individual parts were cut off and destroyed. At the same time, our aviation forbade enemy aircraft from delivering ammunition and fuel to the encircled grouping.
Since the fighting unfolded both on the internal and external fronts of the encirclement, in order to ensure better command and control of the troops, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command assigned the task of destroying the enemy grouping to the 2nd Ukrainian Front, including the 27th Army in its composition, and repelling enemy counterattacks on the outer front instructed the 1st Ukrainian Front, in connection with which the 5th Guards were reassigned to him. tank and 53rd armies.
By February 11, the encircled enemy grouping was heavily compressed. The territory occupied by it did not exceed 450 square meters. km and was shot through by artillery fire. The losses of the troops of the 11th and 42nd army corps increased every day. They suffered especially heavy losses when trying to get out of the encirclement.
On the external front, the Nazi command, having regrouped its forces from the Antonovka, Vinograd region to the Rizino region and pulled up the 1st Panzer Division, created a strike force consisting of three tank (1st, 17th and Adolf Hitler) and infantry (198 -i) divisions. At 08:00 on February 11, the enemy went on the offensive, inflicting the main blow on the defenses of the 47th Rifle Corps of the 6th Tank Army in the direction of Lisyanka. At the same time, the 11th and 13th tank divisions of the enemy, regrouped from the Tolmach area to the Yerki area, launched an auxiliary attack on Zvenigorodka. The encircled grouping from the Steblev area to the southwest was to attack towards these divisions.
In the direction of the main attack, after strong artillery and aviation preparation, the enemy grouping, which had up to 110 tanks, attacked units of the 359th Infantry Division from the Tarasovka line, Rubanny Bridge to Bosovka, and up to 100 of its tanks and assault guns attacked units of the 167th Infantry Division from direction of Rizino to Yablonovka.
The enemy managed to break through the defenses of the 47th Rifle Corps, advance up to 15 km in depth, and by the end of the day reach the river. Rotten Tikich and take possession of Buzhanka. But the enemy infantry, following the tanks, was met by the fire of our rifle units located on the flanks, and stopped in front of the anti-tank strongholds. The divisions of the 47th corps, having lost most of their artillery, under pressure from the enemy retreated towards the flanks: the 359th division - to Bosovka, and the 167th - to Tikhonovka. Here they took up defensive positions and continued to offer organized resistance. Corps commander General I.S. Shmygo with the operational group moved from Buzhanka to Tikhonovka, on the flank of the breakthrough, from where he continued to lead his formations.
To prevent further advance of the enemy tank grouping in the direction of Chesnovka and Lisyanka, the commanders of the fronts and armies took a number of measures. On the 1st Ukrainian Front, two rifle divisions were advanced to the Lisyanka area. The formations of the 2nd Panzer Army also regrouped here.
The 2nd Ukrainian Front began to transfer units of the 20th and 29th tank corps to the breakthrough site. In addition, along the river Rotten Tikich in the area Lisyanka, Zvenigorodka deployed three rifle divisions of the 4th Guards. armies of this front.
On the morning of February 12, the enemy tank group, which had already decreased to 150 tanks, tried to develop a strike in the direction of Lisyanka. With heavy losses, she managed to capture this settlement, but by the evening she was driven out of it.
On February 11 and 12, the enemy grouping, which was breaking through from the encirclement, advanced 2-3 km to the west and reached the Shanderovka area. Here she was stopped by our troops. By that time, this grouping consisted of more than 20 thousand soldiers and officers, 32 tanks and assault guns, 260 guns and mortars.
During February 13-16, fierce fighting continued. In order to strengthen the defense in the area of Dzhurzhentsy, Pochapintsy and prevent the connection of enemy groups, the command of both fronts, at the direction of the Headquarters, transferred two rifle divisions to this area, the 18th and 29th tank corps of the 5th guards. tank army, 5th Guards. a cavalry corps and several artillery and mortar regiments. During the fighting, the Nazis again managed to break into Lisyanka, but they could not develop their offensive to the northeast. The exhausted and bloodless enemy grouping on the outer front of the encirclement on February 16 finally abandoned the offensive. Mobile obstacle detachments played an important role in repelling enemy tank attacks. On the 2nd Ukrainian Front, they planted 35,400 anti-tank and 5,785 anti-personnel mines, which blew up 37 tanks, 15 armored personnel carriers and 23 enemy vehicles.
On the internal front, the enemy was also stopped, but the distance between his groupings on the internal and external fronts in the Shanderovka area was reduced to 8-10 km.
On the night of February 17, when a heavy snowstorm arose, the remnants of the encircled group made a last attempt to break out of the encirclement. But this attempt of the enemy did not bring him success. During the night and day of February 17, Soviet troops defeated the remnants of the enemy's Korsun-Shevchenko grouping.
The enemy tank grouping, located on the outer front, was so bled dry that it could not provide any assistance to its encircled troops. During February 18-25, she was thrown back from the Lisyansky ledge to the starting line.
Thus, the Korsun-Shevchenko operation ended with the complete defeat and capture of the encircled enemy group.
Operation results
According to official data, during the fighting, the enemy lost 55 thousand soldiers and officers killed and wounded, more than 18 thousand prisoners, as well as a large amount of military equipment and weapons. It should be said that this information does not fully reflect the losses of the enemy. So, when trying to break through the encirclement from the outside, the Germans lost only 20 thousand soldiers and officers killed and a large number of technical means of struggle, in particular, 329 aircraft, more than 600 tanks, over 500 guns.
German prisoners of war
On February 18, Moscow, on behalf of the Motherland, saluted with 20 artillery salvos from 224 guns in honor of the new victory of the Soviet Armed Forces. The troops that participated in the defeat of the enemy grouping were thanked. Thousands of Soviet soldiers were awarded orders and medals of the USSR for courage and heroism in battles, and dozens of the most distinguished were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.
As a result of the operation, the Korsun-Shevchenkovsky ledge was liquidated, which created favorable conditions for the implementation of new offensive operations and advancement to the Southern Bug.
The Korsun-Shevchenkovsky operation is an outstanding operation to encircle and destroy a large enemy grouping, prepared in a short time and carried out in difficult meteorological conditions. It showed that the Red Army had completely mastered the highest form of operational art - the art of encircling and destroying the enemy.
In this operation, the Soviet command masterfully used surprise, devastating blows, extensive maneuvering, reaching the rear of the enemy, the speed of the troops, their regrouping, stubbornness in the defense and perseverance in the offensive.
The Korsun-Shevchenkovsky operation acquired a large spatial scope and involved a significant number of troops and equipment on both sides. In total, about 26 divisions participated from the enemy's side on the external and internal fronts, including nine tank divisions, large aviation forces, and a lot of artillery. This entire group of Nazis during the fighting was almost completely defeated by the Soviet troops.
Memorial to the Korsun-Shevchenko operation
M.I. Bazilev, G.V. Kiyanchenko, K.O. Shurupov, L.P. Khodchenko, G.M. Yablonsky. Korsun-Shevchenko operation
When planning military operations for the winter of 1944, the purpose of the operations of the Soviet troops in the southwestern direction was to launch an offensive with the forces of the 1st, 2nd, 3rd and 4th Ukrainian fronts, defeat the army groups "South" and "A" , liberate the Right-Bank Ukraine and create conditions for the exit of Soviet troops to the southern state border. The Korsun-Shevchenkovsky operation, carried out from January 24 to February 17, 1944, was aimed at destroying the enemy grouping in a deep ledge formed as a result of the Zhytomyr-Berdichev and Kirovograd operations. This grouping included parts of the forces of the German 1st Panzer and 8th Field Armies of Army Group South (Field Marshal E. Manstein). In total, it included 10 infantry, 2 tank divisions, the SS Walloon motorized brigade, 4 assault gun battalions, as well as a large number of artillery and engineering reinforcement units. She was supported by the aviation of the 4th Air Fleet. In total, the Korsun-Shevchenko enemy grouping numbered more than 170 thousand people, 1640 guns and mortars, 140 tanks and assault guns, up to 1000 aircraft.
The enemy kept the largest reserves in the area west and northwest of Kirovograd (4 tank divisions) and in the area southwest of Okhmatov (3 tank divisions of the 1st Panzer Army), which made it possible to quickly transfer them to the area of the Zvenigorod-Mironovsky ledge.
The enemy was preparing the salient not only for a stable defense, but also as a starting point for offensive operations. By holding him, he did not allow the adjacent flanks of the 1st and 2nd Ukrainian fronts to close, prevented their advance to the Southern Bug, threatened to strike at the flanks of the fronts and counted on the restoration of defense along the Dnieper.
German tanks in the Korsun-Shevchenkovsky area. January 1944
The nature of the enemy defense along the entire perimeter was different. In front of the 1st Ukrainian Front, in the area of Tynovka, Kagarlyk, the enemy did not have time to create a powerful defense, since he was thrown back to this line on January 10-12. Nevertheless, he managed to cover the strongholds that were here with barriers. The most solid defense with a developed system of fortifications and various kinds of barriers was created by the enemy in the Kagarlyk-Moshny sector.
In the offensive zone of the 2nd Ukrainian Front in the sector of Moshny, Smela, the terrain was swampy, and therefore the enemy’s defense here consisted of separate strongholds that intercepted the main roads. And south of Smela, it was more powerful and consisted of two lanes. At the same time, the main strip was equipped with a system of strongholds and resistance nodes, covered with minefields and barbed wire. The construction of the second lane by the beginning of the offensive of the Soviet troops was not completed. The defending formations and units of the enemy accumulated rich combat experience and, despite the losses suffered in previous battles, retained a high degree of combat capability.
The Headquarters of the Supreme High Command (VGK) assigned the 1st and 2nd Ukrainian Fronts the task of encircling and destroying the enemy grouping in the Korsun-Shevchenkovsky salient. To solve it, she reinforced them with troops, especially mobile ones, military equipment, weapons and ammunition. So, in January, the 47th combined arms and 2nd tank armies, the 6th guards cavalry and the 5th mechanized corps were transferred to the 1st Ukrainian Front from the reserve of the Headquarters of the High Command. From January 22 to February 3, 400 new T-34 tanks were sent to replenish the tank troops. The 2nd Ukrainian Front was reinforced by the 5th Guards Cavalry Corps, redeployed from the offensive zone of the 4th Ukrainian Front.
The operation involved the 40th, 27th, 6th tank armies, part of the forces of the 2nd air army of the 1st Ukrainian Front, 52nd, 4th guards, 53rd, 5th guards tank, 5 -I Air Army and the 5th Guards Cavalry Corps of the 2nd Ukrainian Front, as well as the 10th Fighter Aviation Corps of Air Defense (PVO) of the country. In total, the grouping of Soviet troops included 27 rifle, 3 cavalry divisions, 2 fortified areas, 4 tank and 1 mechanized corps. It numbered over 336 thousand people, about 4 thousand guns and mortars, 376 tanks and self-propelled artillery mounts, over 1000 aircraft. Soviet troops outnumbered the enemy in terms of people by almost 2 times, in artillery - 2.4 times, in tanks - 2.7 times, with approximate equality in aviation.
The plan of the operation envisaged counter strikes by the troops of the left wing of the 1st Ukrainian and the right wing of the 2nd Ukrainian fronts under the base of the ledge in the general direction of Shpola "to surround and destroy the enemy grouping in the Zvenigorod-Mironov ledge" and create conditions for the development of the offensive to the Southern Bug.
Based on the general plan of the operation, the commander of the troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front, General of the Army, decided to break through the enemy defenses on the 27-kilometer section of Tynovka, Koshevatoe, having the 40th, 27th combined arms and 6th tank armies in the first echelon in the direction of the main attack . It was assumed that, taking into account the incompleteness of the enemy defense equipment in the chosen breakthrough sector, a powerful initial strike by infantry and tanks could lead to its rapid breakthrough and the development of an offensive in depth. By the end of the first day of the operation, it was planned to advance 12-15 km, on the second day to capture Zvenigorodka, and by the end of the third day to connect with the troops of the 2nd Ukrainian Front in the Shpola area. In the future, the 6th Panzer Army was planned to be used on the outer front of the encirclement, and part of the forces of the 27th Army on the inner one.
The decision of the commander of the troops of the 2nd Ukrainian Front, General of the Army, provided for a breakthrough in the enemy’s defenses in the direction of the main attack in the area of Verbovka, Krasnosilika in the 19-kilometer section of the adjacent flanks of the 4th Guards and 53rd armies. In the zone of the 53rd Army on the first day of the operation, it was planned to bring the 5th Guards Tank Army into battle to complete the breakthrough of the enemy’s tactical defense zone and develop the offensive with the aim of reaching the Zvenigorodka area on the third or fourth day of the operation.
To the right of the shock grouping of the front, the offensive of the 52nd Army was supposed. For operations on the outer front of the encirclement, the 5th Guards Tank and 53rd Armies were intended, and on the inner front, formations of the 4th Guards and 52nd Armies. In order to hide the direction of the main attack and tie down the enemy forces, it was planned to launch an offensive with the forces of the 5th and 7th Guards armies in the Kirovograd direction the day before the start of the operation.
The troops of the fronts were supported by aviation of the 5th Air Army, and part of the aviation forces of the 2nd Air Army (fighter aviation corps, assault and night bomber aviation divisions) were also involved in the interests of the Korsun-Shevchenko operation. In order to create shock groupings of the fronts, regroupings of troops were carried out. In the 2nd Ukrainian Front, the 5th Guards Tank Army, an artillery breakthrough division, and a number of artillery and engineering units were quickly deployed from the Kirovograd region to the direction of the main attack. In the 1st Ukrainian Front, internal regroupings and reinforcement of the 27th and 40th armies were carried out. As a result of this, even greater superiority over the enemy was achieved in the directions of the main attacks of the fronts: in the 1st Ukrainian - two times in infantry and three times in tanks and artillery; in the 2nd Ukrainian Front - more than three times for infantry, six times for artillery and ten times for tanks.
The operation was prepared in a short time (within five to seven days). At the same time, individual formations of the fronts did not stop active hostilities in other directions. The early thaw and thaw in the Ukraine made it difficult to regroup troops and bring in materiel. Unpaved airfields that had fallen into disrepair and inclement weather limited the possibilities of aviation.
In the preparatory period, the staffs summarized data on the enemy's defense, worked out the organization of interaction between troops. Military and political training sessions were conducted with the personnel. By order of the commander of the troops of the 2nd Ukrainian Front of January 23, 1944, it was ordered to take measures for the strictest preservation of secrecy, to carry out strict camouflage of the grouping of troops, artillery and tanks, to prohibit the movement of vehicles and troops during the day, to observe blackout. It was forbidden to use radio communications before the start of the offensive. However, these demands turned out to be belated, since the enemy had fairly complete information about the groupings of Soviet troops in the breakthrough areas.
In the early morning of January 24, after a powerful artillery raid, the forward battalions of the 4th Guards and 53rd armies of the 2nd Ukrainian Front went on the attack. As a result of stubborn fighting, by the end of the day they captured the strongholds in the first and partly in the second position to a depth of 2 to 6 km. On the morning of January 25, after a 10-minute artillery preparation, the main forces of the front, including the 5th Guards Tank Army, went on the offensive. to Shpola. The 29th Panzer Corps of the Major General of the Panzer Troops reached Vodyany and Lipyanka with forward units.
I.S. Konev and P.S. Rotmistrov at an observation post during the Korsun-Shevchenko offensive operation. Winter 1944
The German command, realizing that the strike of the troops of the 2nd Ukrainian Front in the direction of Shpola poses a serious threat to the entire Korsun-Shevchenko group, hastily began to create counterattack groupings of troops in the Novo-Mirgorod area (three tank divisions) and north of Pastorskoye (up to three infantry and one armored division). On January 27, they launched a counterattack from the north and south in the general direction of Ositnyazhka and closed the gap formed in the defense. At the same time, the advanced units of the 20th and 29th tank corps that broke through were cut off from the main forces of the front.
To restore communication with these corps and eliminate the threat of the enemy on the flanks of the breakthrough, the commander of the front forces brought into battle the 25th tank brigade of the 29th tank corps and the 18th tank corps, as well as the 5th guards cavalry corps from the front reserve. Through the joint efforts of these formations and rifle divisions of the 4th Guards and 53rd Armies, after three days of heavy fighting in the area of Kapitonovka and Tishkovka, they managed to push back the enemy and restore interrupted communications with the 20th and 29th tank corps.
At this time, the mobile troops of the 2nd Ukrainian Front, which had entered the Shpola area, continued to successfully move forward. At noon on January 28, the 155th Tank Brigade of the 20th Guards Tank Corps was among the first to break into Zvenigorodka. Towards the troops of the 2nd Ukrainian Front on January 26, from the opposite side of the base of the Korsun-Shevchenkovsky ledge, the troops of the 40th, 27th and 6th tank armies of the 1st Ukrainian Front struck. Having broken through the first position of the enemy, the troops of the main grouping of the front rushed deep into his defenses. The enemy offered stubborn resistance and with the forces of two tank divisions launched a counterattack on the right flank of the 40th Army in the direction of Okhmatov. To strengthen it, the commander of the front forces transferred the 11th tank corps of the 1st tank army to operational subordination to the commander of the 40th army.
Since the offensive of the 27th and 6th tank armies developed more successfully, the commander of the front forces decided to transfer the main blow to their zone and transferred the 47th rifle corps from the 40th army to the command of the lieutenant general of the tank troops. The immediate task of this corps was to capture a strong enemy resistance center in the village of Vinograd. The 6th Panzer Army was tasked with outflanking it from the south and north, reaching the Zvenigorodka area by the end of January 28 and capturing the Ryzhanovka, Chizhovka, and Rizino lines.
Commander of the 6th Tank Army A.G. Kravchenko (left) with staff officers during the Korsun-Shevchenko operation. Winter 1944
On the morning of January 28, the advance detachment of the 6th Tank Army under the command of the deputy commander of the 5th Mechanized Corps, Major General of the Tank Forces, bypassed the enemy’s stronghold near the settlement from the north. Grapes and, developing the offensive, on January 28 broke into the northwestern outskirts of Zvenigorodka. After stubborn fighting in the western part of the city, at 15:00, the 233rd tank brigade of the 5th mechanized corps connected in the Zvenigorodka area with the advanced units of the 20th tank corps of the 5th tank army of the 2nd Ukrainian Front. For five days of fighting, the enemy grouping was surrounded by counter strikes from the troops of two fronts under the base of the Korsun-Shevchenko ledge.
On February 1, the commander of the troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front set the task of the 27th Army to defeat the encircled enemy grouping together with the troops of the 2nd Ukrainian Front. On the same day, a similar order was given to the troops of the 4th Guards, 52nd Armies and the 5th Cavalry Corps by the commander of the 2nd Ukrainian Front. By February 3, a continuous internal front of encirclement by these forces was created.
By this time, on the outer front, in the area from Tynovka to Zvenigorodka, the 104th Rifle Corps of the 40th Army, the 47th Rifle Corps, the 5th Guards Tank Corps and the 5th Mechanized Corps of the 6th Tank Army of the 1st Ukrainian Front were defending . The 5th Guards Tank Army, consisting of the 49th Rifle Corps, the 18th, 20th and 29th Tank Corps, as well as the 53rd Army of the 2nd Ukrainian Front, defended from Zvenigorodka to Kanizha. In total, on the outer, 120-kilometer encirclement front, the enemy was opposed by 22 rifle divisions, 4 tank and mechanized corps, numbering about 150 thousand people, along with reinforcements, 2736 guns and mortars, 307 tanks and self-propelled artillery installations.
The German command hoped to break through the outer front of the Soviet troops with a strike from tank divisions and release the encircled grouping. To this end, by January 27, four tank divisions of the 8th Army concentrated in the Novo-Mirgorod area, and two tank divisions of the 1st Tank Army began to advance from the area west of Okhmatov to the Rizino area. The commander of the 11th Army Corps, General V. Stemmerman, who led the encircled troops, was ordered to fight to the last bullet.
In late January - early February, the enemy persistently tried to break through to the encircled troops in the zone of the 2nd Ukrainian Front in the areas of Novo-Mirgorod and Tolmach. A surrounded group from the Gorodishche area (10 km north of Vyazovki) attacked them in a southerly direction. However, the stubborn resistance of the troops of the 2nd Ukrainian Front, the enemy's blows on the outer front were repulsed, and soon the troops of the 52nd and 4th Guards armies liquidated the Gorodishche resistance center. After that, the German command transferred the main efforts to the zone of the 1st Ukrainian Front, in the Ryzhanovka, Rizino area. Here, the commander of the 1st Tank Army, General G. Hube, concentrated a strong grouping of four tank divisions, two heavy tank battalions and four assault gun divisions and planned to break through to the encircled troops through Lisyanka. The fact is that it was in this direction that the encircled grouping that held the Steblevsky ledge was closest to the outer front.
On February 4, the enemy struck in the Rizino area and, at the cost of heavy losses, managed to penetrate the defenses of the 47th Rifle Corps. There was a danger of an enemy breakthrough to the encircled divisions. The commander of the troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front gave the order to bring into battle the 2nd tank army (3rd and 16th tank corps) under the command of a lieutenant general of tank troops. On the morning of February 6, in cooperation with the formations of the 40th and 6th tank armies, she launched a counteroffensive. As a result, the advance of the enemy was stopped, in a number of sectors he was thrown back, and some parts of the enemy were surrounded and destroyed in the area of Kosyakovka, Kuchkovka. But the penetration of the enemy into the defense of the Soviet troops was preserved. Moreover, a tank division and three divisions of assault guns were additionally pulled up to this area. To repel a new enemy offensive, by the morning of February 9, the Soviet command advanced to the Lisyanka area the 8th Guards Tank Brigade of the 20th Tank Corps of the 5th Guards Tank Army, reinforced by a self-propelled artillery regiment and one regiment of the 31st anti-tank brigade. At the same time, the commander of the 5th Guards Tank Army received the task of organizing tank and artillery ambushes on the roads. In addition, anti-tank strongholds were organized on the basis of anti-tank artillery units in the corridor separating the encircled enemy troops from the external front. The defense was ready to meet the next offensive of the enemy, and he did not keep himself waiting.
By February 11, the enemy managed to create several strike groups in the areas: Rizino - from the 1st German Panzer Army, Yerki - by the troops of the 8th Army, Steblevo - from the encircled enemy grouping (parts of two infantry divisions, a heavy tank battalion of a tank division SS "Viking" and SS motorized brigade "Wallonia"). With counter strikes, the enemy command intended to release its encircled formations and at the same time encircle the Soviet troops operating in the Ryzhanovka, Lisyanka, Zvenigorodka area. The enemy offensive began on the outer front of the encirclement on the morning of February 11. In the zone of the 2nd Ukrainian Front, its units advancing from the Yerki region managed to occupy the Zvenigorodka station and a number of other settlements by the end of the day. But later the enemy was stopped by the stubborn resistance of the Soviet troops defending there. In the zone of the 1st Ukrainian Front, in the Rizino area, the enemy counterattack grouping broke through the defenses of the 47th Rifle Corps and reached the Lisyanka area. The Marshal of the Soviet Union explained this fact in his report by the loss of control on the part of the commander of the 6th tank army and the commander of the 47th rifle corps. He ordered Army General N.F. Vatutin promptly subordinate them to the commander of the 27th Army. In addition, by the morning of February 12, the main forces of the 2nd Panzer Army were concentrated in this area. Two brigades of the 5th Guards Tank Army were also transferred there. The 202nd Rifle Division was deployed in the Lisyansk direction. Reserve self-propelled artillery regiments also operated here. On the Gniloy Tikich River, along which the second line of defense of the created group of Soviet troops passed, the enemy was stopped, and his attempt to unblock the encircled group failed. At this time, Soviet troops were actively operating on the internal front of the encirclement (13 rifle, 3 cavalry divisions, 2 fortified areas, about 2 thousand guns and mortars, 138 tanks and self-propelled artillery installations). With strikes from various directions, they cut off and then destroyed individual groups and garrisons of the surrounded enemy. They were assisted by partisan detachments.
The encirclement was shrinking, and by February 8, the territory occupied by enemy troops was completely shot through by Soviet artillery. On this day, in order to stop the bloodshed, the Soviet command presented an ultimatum to the encircled troops demanding surrender. However, the ultimatum was rejected. Moreover, the blockaded enemy troops, counting on outside help, made attempts to break out of the encirclement.
Once again, they struck from the Steblev area to the southwest on February 12 in the hope of breaking through the internal front of the Soviet troops and linking up with their tank divisions in the Lisyanka area. Fierce battles unfolded, as a result of which the enemy, suffering numerous losses, managed to reach the Shanderovka area. Some 10-12 km separated the encircled group from the tank divisions that had broken through to the Lisyanka area.
Korsun-Shevchenkovsky offensive operation January 24 - February 17, 1944
After analyzing the situation, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command in its directive pointed out to its representative a number of shortcomings in the coordination of troops. In particular, the following were noted: the absence of a general plan for the destruction of the enemy’s Korsun-Shevchenko grouping by the joint efforts of the 1st and 2nd Ukrainian Fronts, the insufficient combat strength of the 27th Army and the failure to take decisive measures to eliminate, first of all, the enemy’s Steblev ledge, from which the threat of his breakthrough. The headquarters of the Supreme High Command demanded the adoption of effective measures to destroy the encircled enemy grouping. Fulfilling these instructions, formations and units of the 5th Guards Tank Army and the 5th Cavalry Corps, other rifle, tank, artillery and engineering units were urgently transferred to the threatened areas.
On February 12, 1944, the Supreme Command Headquarters decided to subordinate all troops to the commander of the troops of the 2nd Ukrainian Front to destroy the encircled enemy. In accordance with this directive, the 1st Ukrainian Front was entrusted with the task of defending the outer front of the encirclement in its zone. Marshal of the Soviet Union G.K. Zhukov was charged with coordinating the actions of the troops of the 1st and 2nd Ukrainian fronts to repel enemy attempts from the outside to release the encircled troops.
On February 14, formations and units of the 52nd Army liberated the regional center of the Kyiv region - the city of Korsun-Shevchenkovsky, capturing 15 transport aircraft, many other equipment and weapons, as well as warehouses with ammunition and food. Following this, the Soviet troops captured several more heavily fortified strongholds of the enemy, among them - Yablonovka, Tarashcha, Steblev. By February 16, the encircled enemy troops occupied only Shanderovka, Khilki and Komarovka. They were attacked by aircraft and artillery. And yet, early in the morning of February 17, German troops again tried to break out of the encirclement in three columns on a front section of about 4.5 km.
Artillerymen of the 438th anti-tank regiment showed exceptional bravery and courage in repelling enemy attempts to break out of the encirclement. Holding their positions, they successfully repulsed attacks of up to 150 enemy soldiers and officers, destroyed two enemy tanks and one gun. The cadets of the training battalion of the 41st Guards Rifle Division of the Major General fought bravely, destroying several dozen Germans, and 43 were taken prisoner. As a result of the battle, the most distinguished soldiers were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.
While the rifle units repulsed the enemy's onslaught from the front, formations of the 18th, 29th tank and 5th guards cavalry corps went on the attack from the flanks. With a powerful blow, they destroyed scattered columns and groups of the enemy. Only a small number of his tanks and armored personnel carriers managed to break into Lisyanka. By the end of February 17, the enemy grouping, surrounded in the Korsun-Shevchenko ledge, was liquidated.
Destroyed German equipment after the battle near Korsun-Shevchenkovsky. February 1944
In general, during the Korsun-Shevchenko operation, Soviet troops defeated 10 enemy divisions and 1 brigade. This greatly weakened and demoralized his grouping in the southwestern strategic direction. The numbers of German losses in people, equipment and weapons for the operation are different. The irretrievable losses of the Soviet troops in the operation amounted to more than 24 thousand people.
Captured Germans after the defeat of the Korsun-Shevchenko group. February 1944
The main results of the operation include not only the defeat of a powerful enemy grouping that threatened the flanks of the 1st and 2nd Ukrainian fronts, but also a significant reduction in the front line in the middle reaches of the Dnieper and its transfer to a considerable distance to the west. A large part of the territory of Soviet Ukraine with the population living on it was liberated from the enemy. The Red Army captured the strategically important railroad on the right bank of the Dnieper: Fastov - Belaya Tserkov - Korsun-Shevchenkovsky - Znamenka - Dnepropetrovsk. Freedom was acquired by the inhabitants of the liberated area.
The operation of the Soviet troops to encircle and destroy a large enemy grouping in the Korsun-Shevchenkovsky area went down in the history of military art as a brilliant example of this method of defeating the enemy. The Supreme Commander-in-Chief called it "the new Stalingrad". In the most difficult conditions of winter and mudslides, Soviet troops demonstrated high maneuverability and swiftness of action, courage and endurance of soldiers.
In order to break through the enemy's tactical defense zone, the front commands managed in a very short time to create powerful groupings of forces and assets, especially tanks and artillery. The density of artillery in the directions of the main attacks of the fronts in the breakthrough areas reached 100 guns and mortars per kilometer of the front. This largely determined the successful breakthrough of the main line of defense.
A distinctive moment in the art of conducting this operation is the use of tank armies in the first echelon, together with rifle formations, to break through the enemy's defenses. This was how the 6th Tank Army was used in the offensive zone of the 1st Ukrainian Front and the 5th Guards Tank Army as part of the 2nd Ukrainian Front. This was largely due to the lack of direct infantry support tanks in the fronts, and the objectives of the operation required a high rate of breakthrough. In the future, tank armies were used to solve the already traditional task - the development of tactical success into an operational one. It was the swift actions of the tank corps that ensured the creation of both internal and external encirclement fronts. Thus, tank troops were used in the operation both at the stage of breaking through the enemy defenses and for its development.
The massive use of tank troops largely led to the equally massive use of anti-tank weapons, represented in the operation by both engineering troops and anti-tank artillery. In the difficult conditions of slush and impassability, and the rapidly changing situation, the Soviet command had to quickly maneuver these forces and means in order to have time to create a solid anti-tank defense in the enemy's path.
The success of the operation, of course, was not possible without the selfless efforts of the "mother infantry". Only on the outer front of the encirclement, 13 rifle divisions were transferred in a short time, which overcame the impassable path on foot. Such maneuverability of tank and engineer troops, rifle formations and artillery predetermined the positive outcome of the operation of the Soviet troops. They not only managed to respond in time to the actions of the enemy, but also largely forestalled him.
The aviation of the 2nd and 5th air armies, as well as the 10th Air Defense Air Corps of the country, made a significant contribution to the successful completion of the Korsun-Shevchenko operation. Almost a third of all sorties out of 11.3 thousand were carried out to maintain operational air supremacy. More than 6.5 thousand sorties, or over 60% of their total number, were made to support ground forces on the battlefield, strike at enemy reserves and conduct aerial reconnaissance. About 1.2 thousand sorties were involved in the air transportation of goods, taking into account off-road conditions.
Undoubtedly, the highly maneuverable nature of the operation required incredible efforts by the rear workers to supply the troops with fuel and lubricants, ammunition and food, and to evacuate the wounded. And they generally coped with this task.
The local population was of great help in this. Residents of the liberated regions not only helped repair roads, build fortifications, deliver ammunition, but also fought with weapons in their hands. In the village of Kvitki alone, 500 men voluntarily joined the 180th Infantry Division. At the same time, in certain areas of the Right-Bank Ukraine, Soviet troops encountered fierce resistance from nationalist formations. Despite the appeal on February 12, 1944, by the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR with an appeal to lay down their arms, they did not do this. Therefore, the units intended to protect the rear of the army were forced to fight against the Ukrainian nationalists. So, on February 16, 1944, a detachment of border troops to protect the rear of the 1st Ukrainian Front, combing a forest in the area of Romeyka, Perespa, Big Verbche, encountered an armed gang of the UPA (“Ukrainian Insurgent Army”) numbering up to 300 people. The assistant chief of staff of the 2nd border regiment, who commanded the detachment, decided to encircle and destroy the gang, despite its numerical superiority. As a result of the battle, 46 bandits were killed and up to 100 wounded. Against this background, today the attempts of some forces in Western Ukraine to exalt those bandits who fought against the Soviet troops during the Great Patriotic War to national heroes look blasphemous.
On February 18, 1944, Moscow saluted the troops that had completed the liquidation of a large enemy group. Many units and formations received the honorary name "Korsun-Shevchenkovsky". For courage and heroism, dozens of Soviet soldiers were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union, and thousands were awarded orders and medals of the USSR. As a result of the operation, General of the Army I.S. Konev, the first of the commanders of the fronts, was awarded the title of Marshal of the Soviet Union, and the commander of the 5th Guards Tank Army was awarded the military rank of Marshal of the Armored Forces.
The reduction in the length of the front line in the Korsun-Shevchenkovsky direction made it possible to release a significant number of troops and use them for other tasks. During the operation, the troops of the 1st and 2nd Ukrainian Fronts pinned down 25 enemy divisions, including 9 tank divisions, which created favorable conditions for launching an offensive in the Rivne Lutsk and Nikopol directions.
Today, a huge number of monuments and memorials remind us of the heroic victory of the Soviet troops in the Battle of Korsun-Shevchenko. So, for example, a 7.5-meter reinforced concrete ring was built near the village of Steblev - a symbol of the encirclement of German units. And how many monuments-tanks in this area, it is difficult even to enumerate. In the city of Korsun-Shevchenkovsky, in the palace of the princes Lopukhins-Demidovs, there is a museum of the history of the Korsun-Shevchenko battle. It contains a diorama of the battle, a huge number of documents, weapons and equipment of those times.
Memorial complex to those who died during the Korsun-Shevchenko operation. Cherkasy region, Zvenigorodka
Vladimir Khokhlov,
researcher at the Research Institute
(military history) Military Academy
General Staff of the Armed Forces
Russian Federation,
member of the Writers' Union of Russia
At the end of December 1943, the troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front under the command of General of the Army Nikolai Fedorovich Vatutin, advancing from the Kyiv bridgehead, defeated the Zhitomir grouping of the enemy (see the Zhytomyr-Berdichev operation) and by the end of January 1944 advanced in the direction of Rovno-Lutsk up to 300 km from Dnieper. At the same time, the troops of the 2nd Ukrainian Front under the command of General of the Army Ivan Stepanovich Konev, advancing from the Kremenchug bridgehead, captured Kirovograd on January 8, 1944. Thus, the so-called Korsun-Shevchenkovsky ledge that crashed into our front was formed, which was occupied by a large enemy grouping, which included the VII and XI army corps from the 1st tank army of Lieutenant General Hans-Valentin Hube and XXXXII army and XXXXVII tank corps from the 8th Army of General of Infantry Otto Wöhler. In total, 11 infantry divisions defended the ledge (34th, 57th, 72nd, 82nd, 88th, 106th, 112th, 198th, 255th, 332nd and 389th I), 3rd Panzer Division, SS Viking Panzer Division, SS Wallonia Motorized Brigade, regiment of the 168th Infantry Division, reinforced by the 202nd, 239th and 265th Assault Gun Battalions, and the 905th Heavy Assault Gun Battalion.
This same Korsun-Shevchenkovsky ledge the German fascist command hoped to use to strike at the flank and rear of the troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front, operating west of Kyiv, and again seize the Right-Bank Ukraine - in mid-January, the Germans still could not come to terms with the fact that "eastern defensive shaft "finally collapsed, and continued to count on the restoration of defense along the Dnieper.
The enemy took vigorous measures to create a stable defense in the area of the Korsun-Shevchenkovsky ledge, which would ensure the holding of this area and serve as a starting point for the development of offensive operations. It should be emphasized that the terrain in the area of the ledge was very favorable for the creation of defense. Numerous rivers, streams, ravines with steep banks, a large number of settlements contributed to the creation of defensive lines to a great depth, as well as a number of cut-off positions. The heights, especially in the Kanev area, provided the enemy with good observation conditions.
On January 12, 1944, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command issued an order to the 1st and 2nd Ukrainian Fronts to encircle and destroy enemy troops.
On January 24, the Korsun-Shevchenko operation began. At dawn, hundreds of guns opened fire on enemy positions. Powerful artillery fire destroyed fortifications, filled up trenches and communications, and destroyed enemy manpower and military equipment.
As soon as the artillery moved the fire into the depths, the advanced battalions of the 4th Guards and 53rd armies of the 2nd Ukrainian Front went on the attack.
On January 26, from the opposite side of the Korsun-Shevchenkovsky ledge, the troops of the 40th, 27th and 6th tank armies of the 1st Ukrainian Front struck.
On February 17, 1944, the Korsun-Shevchenko operation ended, during which two German army corps were defeated. Of course, in scope this battle was far inferior to the Battle of Stalingrad, but the military propaganda of the Second World War even then introduced the term "Stalingrad on the Dnieper", painfully apocalyptic pictures of abandoned equipment and German corpses lying side by side resembled (albeit on a reduced scale) what could be seen after the collapse and surrender of the 6th Army in Stalingrad.
General description of the operation and a little chronicle
In principle, if it were not for the fact that part of the Germans, unlike Stalingrad, managed to slip out of the ring, this operation would certainly have taken its rightful place among other, most significant battles of the war, but a slight aftertaste of incompleteness remained behind it even in Soviet times. Nevertheless, the victory was very loud, and such famous military leaders as Konev and Rotmistrov became marshals precisely because of this victory. On the part of the Germans, the battle, like many other operations of 1943-1944, was remembered for the massive use of armored vehicles, including the advanced "Tigers" and "Panthers" at that time. Manstein, in his memoirs, consoled himself with the fact that the deblocking strikes, which allowed part of the Germans to escape from the boiler, proved him right about the possibility of Paulus breaking through from Stalingrad towards the troops of Army Group Don. But the realities of 1944 were such that even this semblance of success did not fundamentally change anything in the next bleak defeat of the Wehrmacht, a series of which, since the time of Kursk, had been an endless stream. The reckoning for 1941 was inexorably advancing.
On the occasion, a selection of photographs from this remarkable cauldron.
Field Marshal Erich von Manstein, who from late autumn 1942 to early spring 1944 was the main opponent of our generals and marshals in Ukraine.
Near Korsun-Shevchenkovsky, Manstein "lost" another victory.
Heavy tanks "Tiger" in the winter of 1944 played an important role in the ability of German units to deliver counter-attacks and
hold the line against the advancing Soviet mechanized formations.
Oberstleutnant Franz Becke, commander of the Becke heavy tank regiment. In the center with binoculars.
He's next to his tank.
German soldiers change position under cover of heavy Tiger tanks.
Commander of the 11th Army Corps Wilhelm Shtremmerman.
In the cauldron.
Lieutenant Walter Scherf on his "Tiger".
Rotmistrov and Konev. (photo apparently already in the spring of 1944)
Yu-52 transport aircraft, with the help of which the Germans, as in Stalingrad, tried to supply the encircled group.
A column of German armored vehicles rushes to the rescue.
Machine gunner in the cauldron.
Soviet 203-mm gun firing at the enemy.
Soviet troops were intensely preparing for new offensive operations. The picture shows the crew of the T-34-76 "Marshal Choibalsan" tank of one of the brigades ("Revolutionary Mongolia" column) of the 1st Tank Army (from left to right): guards senior sergeant Okunev, foreman Finko and lieutenant Leushin. It can be seen that the new "thirty-four" is modernized, with a commander's cupola, and the fighters are well equipped. 1st Ukrainian Front, 44 brigade February 8, 1944
Already obsolete by the beginning of 1944, the T-34-76 crosses the road, on which the wrecked "Tiger" is burning down.
Soldiers of the "Wallonia" division in the Cherkasy forests. Unterscharführer Desire Lecocq is in the center.
The German infantry keeps the defense at the edge of the forest.
Machine-gun crew of the SS Panzer Grenadier Division "Wallonia". The division consisted mainly of
Walloons, French and representatives of other peoples of conquered Europe.
position in the forest.
Light armored vehicle BA-64 during reconnaissance of the area 1st Ukrainian Front, February 1944
Future Marshal of Tank Troops Rotmistrov
Anti-tank self-propelled gun Shtug.
The offensive of the Soviet troops
German map which shows a diagram of the breakthrough of the remnants of the encircled troops from the boiler.
Retreat road.
Tanks and armored personnel carriers of the 1st Panzer Division begin to move in the direction of the boiler with the aim of deblocking the encircled.
Unlike Stalingrad, the Germans were much better equipped in this cauldron.
German armored vehicles.
Heavy tank "Tiger" before the attack.
Statement of the combat mission.
Fighters with anti-tank guns.
Column PZ-IV at the crossroads.
Column "Panther".
Statement of the combat mission.
On the march In the background are PZ-IV tanks with screen armor.
The Germans before the attack. In the background you can see the "Tigers" lined up in a ledge for an attack.
Attack. The landing party takes cover behind the armor.
Close combat.
Damaged tank "Panther" captured by Soviet troops.
In a Ukrainian village
Tractor with anti-tank gun.
In 1944, motorcyclists had long lost that image of the vanguard of the blitzkrieg, which was firmly entrenched in the battles of the summer and autumn of 1941.
The directions of the attacks of the 1st Panzer Division and the "Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler" in the direction of the boiler.
Columns of Germans are trying to escape from the boiler.
The same heavy weapons that Manstein regretted losing in the cauldron in his memoirs.
Corpses and abandoned equipment of the SS division "Viking".
This is not lucky.
The commander of the SS division "Wallonia" Leon Degrel and the commander of the division of the SS "Viking" Herbert Gille after a breakthrough from the encirclement. This is lucky.
Hitler rewards those who are lucky enough to get out of the encirclement. In the first photo - the Belgian Nazi Degrel.
But these proceeded in a different direction.
German officers who surrendered in the area of Korsun-Shevchenkovsky, in the Soviet camp. From left to right: Brid, Wolf (Captain Mastyakov from the camp administration), Mikhel, Hinze. Territory of the USSR, March 1944
A group of prisoners in a Ukrainian village.
Broken German column. Korsunsky boiler. January 1944.
Defeat near Cherkassy.
Abandoned and broken cars. The photo shows a broken Volkswagen type 82 Kubelwagen and a Peugeot truck. Korsunsky boiler. January-February 1944.
Killed while trying to break through on the night of February 18, General Wilhelm Stemmermann.
Captured Germans with the body of the murdered Stemmermann. By order of the future Marshal Konev, he was buried with military honors.
Abandoned six-barreled mortars.
Heavy tank Pz.Kpfw.V "Panther" from the 5th SS Panzer Division "Viking". The combat vehicle was abandoned due to technical malfunctions. 1st Ukrainian Front, Korsun-Shevchenko operation, February 1944
Abandoned Pak 97/38 anti-tank gun.
Captured Germans from the Korsun cauldron.
A column of prisoners leaving the horizon.
And in the end, some Soviet sketches on the topic.
This one, apparently, although it uses a stylized photograph of a defeated German column, but apparently from some kind of set of foreign soldiers.
On Konev I would like to stop separately. He underwent an extremely amusing evolution, from a general who suffered one of the most terrible defeats of 1941 and whom only Zhukov's intercession saved from the fate of Pavlov, by the end of the war he was promoted to the ranks of the leading Soviet marshals. The victory near Korsun-Shevchenkovsky became for him an important step to the very top of the Soviet military hierarchy, and after a little over a year, he will try to compete with Zhukov for the role of the conqueror of Berlin and Marshal of Victory No. 1.
In general, in the people's memory, he could never take the first place, where Zhukov and Rokossovsky shared popularity, but due to his victories at the end of the war, he entered the top three and almost always speaking about the marshals of victory, Konev is commemorated 2nd or 3rd. m, depending on the sympathy for his more successful colleagues.
The operation itself and the terrible scenes of the defeat of the German units were a prologue to the very "10 Stalinist blows", after which the Wehrmacht could no longer recover.
The collection contains images.