“Only in Russia and Spain did Napoleon encounter a real frenzy of the people. People left their dwellings, sometimes burned them, stole cattle, only so that the enemy would not get it, ”historian Alexander Valkovich told the VZGLYAD newspaper. At the same time, the Patriotic War was overgrown with myths; its events in Russia and France can be interpreted in completely different ways. Whose side is the truth on?
On Friday, Russia celebrates one of the days of military glory - the Day of the Battle of Borodino. The legendary battle ended exactly 205 years ago, but there are still disputes - in whose favor?
Historians also argue about the significance of this battle for the conflict between Russia and France, for Napoleon personally and for the fate of the world as a whole. About the myths that accompany the memory of Borodino, about the opposition to Kutuzov in the Russian army, about the marauders and about the popular character of that war, the VZGLYAD newspaper talked with the president of the International Military Historical Association, Alexander Valkovich.
VZGLYAD: Let's immediately try to debunk the most famous myths about the Battle of Borodino ...
Alexander Valkovich: Willingly. Myth number one is that Borodino was a turning point in the Patriotic War of 1812. This is not true. The real turning point occurred later, on October 12 (24), 1812 at Maloyaroslavets. It was after him that Napoleon was forced to abandon offensive actions and retreat, and the Russian command took the initiative into their own hands. Borodino was the only pitched battle during that war.
Myth number 2. Regarding the fact that both in the ranks of the French and in our ranks there was complete unity, all the generals merged in a single impulse. This is not true. Serious disagreements were observed both between the Russian generals and between the Napoleonic marshals. If we talk about the Russian army, we have not only Barclay de Tolly was dissatisfied with the appointment of Kutuzov as commander in chief, which, in principle, is known. Also Bagration was against it. It was he who was considered the most promising student and favorite of Suvorov. In a word, the Russian army had its own opposition, its own opposition, and Russian politics had its own "French" and "English" parties.
Finally, the main myth. We were convinced from the school bench that the Russian army won at Borodino. In fact, none of the opposing sides achieved their goals. The French were unable to defeat our army, and our army held out, but retreated, maintaining order. On points, to use boxing terminology, Russia lost. The army that leaves the battlefield first is considered the loser. However, the formally victorious French did not solve their tasks, they were dejected by the outcome of the battle, and soon lost the war altogether. Therefore, it would be more correct to say that there was a draw under Borodino.
VZGLYAD: Is Napoleon's cold also a myth? Like, if he hadn’t had a runny nose that day, could everything have gone differently?
AV: Napoleon was really unwell. But his cold could no longer affect either the disposition he had drawn up earlier, or other key parameters of the battle. He determined the direction of the main attack of the French army in advance. “Having started the car”, the French emperor could no longer significantly influence its movement; his marshals and generals, corps commanders were already responsible for the outcome of the battle to a greater extent.
VZGLYAD: That is, he was responsible for the strategy. Didn't he influence tactical issues anymore?
A. V .: Influenced, but only partially. Napoleon's only decision on the battlefield, which theoretically could significantly change the course of the battle, was to launch or not to launch his Old Guard, the most elite unit. The marshals asked him about it, but he did not agree. If Napoleon had broken through the line of Russian defense with the help of the Old Guard, yes, the outcome could have been different. But we can talk about this only in the subjunctive mood.
In addition, the decision to leave the Old Guard in reserve from the point of view of Napoleon himself was the right one. After all, it was this elite unit that subsequently saved his life, saved the remnants of his retreating army in the battle of Krasnoe.
VZGLYAD: What other mistakes did Napoleon make? Or did he do everything right, but he was unlucky?
A. V .: From the height of our current knowledge, Napoleon’s decision to start a war with Russia could be called a fatal mistake. And at Borodino, he acted in the forehead, although, for example, Marshal Davout suggested that he go to the Russian left flank, where our most vulnerable position was.
VZGLYAD: Is “General Frost” a myth or not a myth?
A.V.: Mostly a myth. If you look objectively, the French left Moscow in mid-October, when the weather was fine in autumn. And only at the end of November - December it became really cold.
At the same time, the French themselves are to a large extent to blame for their problems, who, while in Moscow, did not take sufficient measures, did not prepare stocks of warm clothes. For example, the more prudent Poles, who also sided with Napoleon, took care of this in advance, dressed warmer and shod their horses. During the retreat, when the roads froze, the unshod French horses slipped and fell en masse.
VZGLYAD: That is, it was not the climate that failed the French, but their own hindsight?
A.V.: Yes. But that's not even the point. The main thing is the demoralization of the army, which began with Moscow. The result is complete disorganization. The French had collected large stocks of food in Smolensk, but they were never able to organize its distribution during the retreat. Most of the supplies were simply looted. And already no actions of Napoleon - even the execution of marauders - could improve his position.
In addition, the factor of the "people's" war played a serious role against Napoleon. Just as in Spain, in Russia he faced a real frenzy of the people. Only in these two countries did people leave their dwellings, sometimes they burned them, they stole cattle, only so that the enemy would not get it.
VZGLYAD: If there was a draw near Borodino and Borodino was not the battle that determined the course of the war, why do we single it out? Could another, definitely victorious.
A.V.: Firstly, because it was the biggest battle of that campaign. And, secondly, as Lev Nikolaevich Tolstoy rightly put it, at Borodino the Russians won a moral victory. Our troops showed mass heroism. Without hesitation, they sacrificed themselves. From a soldier to a general, everyone had one thought: the enemy should not be in the heart of our Motherland, in Moscow. And although Moscow was briefly abandoned later, Borodino, in fact, is a monument to the dedication, resilience and courage of Russians.
Borodino has long been considered a turning point battle for other reasons. In addition to heavy casualties, the real disaster for Napoleon was the loss of a significant part of the cavalry. The Borodino field is called the grave of the French cavalry. And the cavalry is called upon to go in the forefront, to cover the march of their army, to carry out reconnaissance, to ensure maneuvering. The French could not make up for the loss in the horse composition. Therefore, the rest of the time, Napoleon acted, by and large, blindly. It was not for nothing that the cavalry was called at that time the "eyes and ears" of the army.
VZGLYAD: How many people from both sides participated in the battle, how many losses were there?
A.V.: Over 130,000 French and, according to the latest data, about 150,000 Russians, if you count together with the militia. But usually, when comparing regular armies, the militia is not taken into account. In general, the forces were approximately equal. In terms of losses - the French lost more than 30 thousand people, ours - 48 thousand killed, wounded and missing.
VZGLYAD: Why did more of ours die?
A.V .: Napoleon was famous for his ability to assemble into “one fist”, to ensure the superiority of artillery in the direction of the main attack. Our main losses are connected with this. Much more Russian soldiers died from the fire of French artillery than from the Russian - the French and their allies.
VZGLYAD: Can Borodino be called the bloodiest one-day battle at that time?
AV: Strictly speaking, Borodino was not a one-day battle. He was preceded by the Shevardinsky battle. Together with him, the Battle of Borodino lasted two days.
In 1812, this was indeed the most significant and bloody battle. But, if we talk about the entire long-term war, including the Foreign Campaign of the Russian army, then in the three-day battle near Leipzig in October 1813, in the so-called “Battle of the Nations”, more than 190 thousand people fought on the side of the French, on the side of Russia and its allies - over 350 thousand. As a result, the French lost 60 thousand, and the allies - more than 50 thousand.
VZGLYAD: How big are the discrepancies regarding the assessment of the Battle of Borodino among our and foreign historians? Say, the French unambiguously give victory to Napoleon's army?
A.V.: For a long time, for a century and even two after Borodino, the myth of the complete victory of the French was really popular abroad. But in recent decades in the West, in France, a lot of critical literature has appeared on this subject. In general, the events at Borodino are now given a much more restrained assessment. Serious historians abroad also talk not only about the formal outcome of the battle, but also about what this “winning” gave the French, what it brought them to later. Increased fame? May be. But they did not solve the tasks at all.
VZGLYAD: Why do Russian and French historians have discrepancies even in terms of losses at Borodino? The French estimate their losses at a maximum of 28 thousand people, and Russian and British historians at 35 thousand?
A.V.: Because the French historians had in mind only the actual losses in the French units and did not mention the losses in the troops allied to Napoleon. You should not look for something else here.
VZGLYAD: To what extent, in principle, has politics dominated and continues to dominate objective perception? Probably, French artists were more willing to paint respectable Napoleonic marshals in the middle of the Moscow fire than retreating and freezing soldiers of the Great Army. It is also somehow not heard that the French actively recalled the looting of their soldiers in the Moscow Kremlin or the arrangement of stables in churches.
A.V.: I do not agree. It seems to me that the French battle painters quite often depicted scenes of the retreat of their army in 1812. In my opinion, no one is hiding anything on purpose. It is known about the victories, and about the defeats, and about the facts of looting, which are inherent in almost every war.
It is clear that when crossing the Neman, entering Russia, the soldiers of the Napoleonic army wanted to increase not only glory, but also wealth. It is clear that for the French it was not a war to defend their borders, but a war of conquest. Therefore, everything is logical. Russian soldiers during the Foreign campaign, having entered Paris, were also engaged in looting. It was not of a mass nature, but it also happened.
Perhaps someone romanticizes the war of 1812 too much. Yes, then there were cases when prisoners were released on parole that they would not fight for some time. But there was blood and looting. War is war.
Historian Yevgeny Ponasenkov on the next anniversary of the Battle of Borodino.
Knowledge about history is drawn from documents, analyzed with the help of logic, and conclusions are compared with what we understand from our own experience. All my life I have been researching the topic of the war of 1812, participated in dozens of scientific conferences, as well as in talk shows on TV and radio: and I will try to write this article in extremely simple and clear terms, using exclusively primary sources, and not “water” and conjectures ( what my "opponents" are famous for).
It must be stated: among scientists today there are no two opinions - the battle of Borodino is the defeat of the Russian army and the victory of Napoleon. Some budget-dependent comrades are still trying by demagogic means to call it “not quite a complete defeat of the Russians”, or “only a tactical victory for Napoleon”, but the Russian army lost almost half of the regular troops, soon after the battle it completely decomposed (thousands of marauders who plundered their own villages and were the first to plunder Moscow), and the "shrine" - Moscow was forced to surrender without a fight at the mercy of the winner. Army M.I. Kutuzova fled so fast that about 30,000 Russian wounded were abandoned there (after which his own Governor-General F.V. Rostopchin burned the city, and Kutuzov himself contributed to this by ordering the fire tool to be taken out). The hourly (!) story of the burning of the city has already been described by me in a past documentary study, and now we will consider sources relating to the goals, plans and estimates of M.I. Kutuzov regarding the Battle of Borodino (that is, exclusively his direct speech in personal letters and in official documents of the headquarters, not French sources and not later texts).
I will quote primary sources, documents: they must forever bury the nonsense of cheap demagogues who, taking advantage of the ignorance of ordinary readers, hang noodles on their ears, trying to suggest that Kutuzov did not want to defend Moscow from the very beginning (although he was appointed with the obligation to do so). At the same time, I will immediately emphasize: you never know what the mediocre general did not want to defend: his duty is to win battles and defend his native land, all the more an item of colossal material, political and moral significance. In addition, you will learn Kutuzov's own criterion for evaluating Borodin as a victory or defeat for the Russians.
So, on the day of arrival at the army (August 17 according to the old style - the 29th according to the new one), the commander-in-chief of the Russian army M.I. Kutuzov wrote to F.V. Rostopchin: “In my opinion, the loss of Russia is connected with the loss of Moscow” (M.I. Kutuzov. Collection of documents. M., 1955, vol. 4, part 1, p. 90).
The next day, Kutuzov assured Field Marshal N.I. Saltykov and the tsar himself that he would give battle to Napoleon for the sake of saving Moscow. A day later, he writes to the commander of the Moldavian army (since recently it has become known as the Danube) Admiral P.V. Chichagov: “My real subject is the salvation of Moscow” (Ibid., pp. 97, 106, 113).
I.I. Markov (the head of the Moscow militia), the day before the Battle of Borodino, handed over to F.V. Rostopchin is Kutuzov’s definition: “He (Napoleon - my note, E.P.) cannot be allowed to reach Moscow. Let him go, all of Russia will be his ”(People's militia in the Patriotic War of 1812: Collection of documents. M., 1962, p. 71).
Moreover, as if specifically for historians, Kutuzov personally formulated his own criterion for defeat, failure - and this is a retreat. In the official disposition of September 5 (August 24 according to the old style), he wrote: commander-in-chief (Barclay and Bagration - my note, E.P.) and along which armies will have to retreat ”(M.I. Kutuzov. Collection of documents ... p. 129).
I will strongly repeat the only documented criterion for evaluating the outcome of the battle, formulated personally by Kutuzov, moreover, officially and in writing: “... if I am defeated, I will go to Moscow, and there I will defend the Capital” / from a letter to Rostopchin dated September 3 - August 22. under Art. style / (Moscow in 1812. Memoirs, letters and official documents from the collection of the written sources department of the State Historical Museum. M., 2012, p. 297).
The circumstances of the battle itself, the number and loss of troops (the Russians had more - and managed to lose more, because M.I. Kutuzov first positioned the army categorically incorrectly, and then did not actually command ...) we have already considered in my recent study.
Let's continue the analysis of the results of the battle. Many Russian soldiers, who left us written testimonies, recognized Borodino as a defeat for their army - and a victory for Napoleon. Among them, for example, the brave and principled A.P. Yermolov, who declared: “the enemy has won” (Patriotic War and Russian Society. 1812 - 1912. M., 1912, vol. IV, p. 29).
Soon after the battle, the adjutant of Vladimir Ivanovich Levenshtern (1777-1858), officer Fadeev, wrote to A.D. Bestuzhev Ryumin "The enemy will certainly enter Moscow, because our army has completely died." The Governor-General of Moscow, Rostopchin, reported: “I wrote a note to the Minister of Police that I do not understand this victory, because our armies retreated to Mozhaisk ...” (Ibid.).
And who announced the “victory” of the Russians? Who laid the foundation for the formation of a completely mentally and actually inadequate myth of “victory”, after which the army, having lost half, flees to Moscow, surrenders Moscow, and then dissolves and barely gathers in a distant camp? The answer is simple: this is still the same “Zubov’s coffee pot”, who “slept through” the entire battle, the person who is largely responsible for the terrible defeat - Kutuzov. He very, very cunningly (in the spirit of an eighteenth century courtier) wrote a beautiful report to the king with the words “the enemy has not won a single step of the earth anywhere” (which, as we already know, was an absolute, one hundred percent lie). Thus, in St. Petersburg they managed to rejoice, they reasoned that Napoleon had been stopped, that Moscow had been saved! (Patriotic war and Russian society .... p. 29).
The tsar, in false joys, granted Kutuzov a field marshal's determination and 100,000 rubles! However, when the deception about the “victory” soon became clear, Kutuzov did not return all this (although the tsar wrote him irritated letters!) ...
Let us now analyze the most important documents of eyewitnesses - letters from the soldiers of Napoleon's army, sent immediately after the battle: “Artilleryman of the Dutch army F.Sh. List expressed the hope that after the defeat on the Moskva River (as the French called the Battle of Borodino - my note, E.P.) and the actual destruction of the Russian army, Emperor Alexander I should soon sue for peace. And further: “... General Zh.L. Scherer stated in his letter: “The battle of September 7 cost the Russian army at least 50,000 people (a strikingly accurate estimate, confirmed by Russian archival records - my note, E.P.). And this is despite the fortifications and a very good position, ”and the battalion chief of the 17th regiment, J.P.M. Barrier wrote that the Russians lost 40,000 in the battle. The musician of the 35th regiment, J. Eichner, stated: “The Russians are no longer able to campaign against us, since they will never find a position, as near Smolensk and Mozhaisk. (...) the captain of the old guard K. Van Bekop, although he admitted that the French suffered heavy losses in the battle of Borodino, claimed that according to his calculations, which he made directly on the battlefield, the Russians lost six times more. ... Su-lieutenant L.F. Kuantin counted 8 dead Russians for one Frenchman. (...) ... lieutenant of the quartermaster department of the 25th regiment P.O. Paradis, who in two letters - to Mademoiselle Genevieve Bonnegras dated September 20 and to his father dated September 25 - claimed that he personally counted 20 dead Russians for one Frenchman ”(Promyslov N.V. French public opinion about Russia on the eve and during the war of 1812. M., 2016, pp. 149; 154-155).
But the main consequence of Borodin was the catastrophe of Moscow's capitulation! Soon the already mentioned battalion commander of the 17th line regiment J.P.M. Barrier wrote in a letter to his wife: “On the 14th (September, my note, E.P.) we entered Moscow. They took many prisoners in the city. Their army no longer exists. Their soldiers desert, not wanting to fight, retreating all the time and seeing themselves beaten in all cases when they decide to resist us ”(Zemtsov V.N. Battle of the Moscow River. M., 2001, p. 265).
This document categorically testifies to the state of complete defeat and decomposition of the Russian army after Borodin.
We also find information about mass desertion in many official Russian army documents (for more on this, see previous articles).
When we know the testimonies of Russians, French and outside observers, we ask ourselves: how did Napoleon himself evaluate the battle? We have a number of documentary evidence. The first is official: in the eighteenth bulletin of the Great Army, which presented a description of the Battle of Borodino as a brilliant victory for the French (“War of Feathers”: official reports on the hostilities of 1812-1814: collection of documents. St. Petersburg, 2014, p. 332 -334).
The second evidence is purely personal, intimate. In a letter to his wife Marie-Louise, Napoleon reported (immediately after the battle) that he “beat the Russians” (Castello A. Napoleon. M., 2004, p. 318). As for the fake phrase that was printed in Soviet propaganda agitations, and which migrated to the garbage Wikipedia (about “the least success was won”), this falsification was exposed three decades ago by the doctor of historical sciences N.A. Troitsky (Troitsky N.A. 1812. The Great Year of Russia. M., 2007, p. 295-296).
Among other records made from the words of Napoleon already on about. Helena, there is also this (about the Russians near Borodino): “... I defeated them in a big deal at the Moscow River; with ninety thousand I attacked the Russian army ... and I defeated it utterly. Fifty thousand Russians remained on the battlefield. The Russians had the imprudence to claim that they won the battle, and, nevertheless, eight days later I entered Moscow ”(Thunderstorm of the twelfth year. M., 1991, p. 563).
Where did Kutuzov's reverse phrase about "with the loss of Moscow, the army was not lost" come from? But it’s very simple: it was said at the council in Fili by Barclay de Tolly (Yermolov A.P. Decree op., p. 205), who understood that if you give a new battle, then the already defeated army will be completely destroyed - and all the generals will either death, or tribunal. Kutuzov heard this - and with great joy he clung to this, simply joining forces with Barclay: and shifting all responsibility to him. Moreover, the decision to leave Moscow, Kutuzov, pronounced in French. The general, who lost everything, who destroyed the army, simply tried to cover up his shame with demagoguery - but with the support of state propaganda, he succeeded.
The main secret of the battle of Borodino
Let's start with the fact that there was a period in the history of our country when all our achievements and discoveries were considered more significant than in other countries.
From 1917 to 1991, many books were published in the USSR that proved the advantages of the Soviet way of life in all its manifestations. And the history of the past was embellished in such a way that now you don’t understand where the truth is and where the fiction is. And only today historians, and even then with considerable difficulty, are gradually beginning to get to the truth ...
Who won the Battle of Borodino?
What's question? Are not the words written even in school textbooks General Yermolov:
"The French army crashed against the Russian."
It was we who defeated Napoleon, not he us! All this, of course, is true. But if you look not only at the textbook, but also, for example, on the Internet, you can see how the information found there differs. The data on the number of troops on the battlefield do not match, and even in the notes of eyewitnesses of this battle there are serious discrepancies.
For example, there is data that Napoleon at Borodino had 135 thousand soldier, while Kutuzov – 120
. And here are other figures: the French - 133,8
, Russians - 1 54,8
thousands of people. And which ones are true? Moreover, this number includes 11 thousand Cossacks and 28.5 thousand militias. That is, numerically, we, it seems, in this case were superior to the French, but qualitatively they 
outnumbered us, because the combat capabilities of the militias were small. But in all sources the number of guns is the same: 640 guns we have and 587 from the French.
So we had for 53 guns more, and at that time it was a great power.
There is evidence that in the French army per 1000 meters could only shoot 10% guns, and the rest are at 600-700.
But in the Russian army there were more heavy guns capable of firing at 1200 m. In addition, it is easier to defend than to attack, especially on fortifications, even mediocre ones.
Therefore, the losses of the attackers were always greater than those of the defenders!
Now let's look at the results of the battle. The French themselves estimated their losses in 28 thousand people. Some books say that Napoleon lost 50
, a Kutuzov – 44 thousand soldiers. However, there are other data that are directly opposite, and there is still no clarity on this important issue!
The last argument of kings
It is known that his biography Napoleon began as an artillery officer and that he received good knowledge in this area, which he later often used in battles. Choosing the direction of the main blow, Bonaparte collected a battery of a hundred or more guns, which ensured the continuity of fire. The fact is that the then smooth-bore guns were reloaded rather slowly, and the batteries were fired not in one gulp, but with guns in turn. And if there were few guns in such a battery, then its commander had to wait until the servants loaded them all. When the last of the cannons of Napoleon's "great batteries" fired, the first was already loaded, so they fired continuously. Did exactly the same Bonaparte and in battle at Borodino.
But the Russian army used its guns more traditionally. Several dozen guns were installed on Semyonovskie flushes, at Kurgan height and in many other places. However, their total number nowhere reached a hundred guns. Furthermore, 305 guns by order Kutuzov have been placed in reserve near the village of Psarevo where they remained until the end of the battle. It is clear that the wrecked guns were constantly replaced by those standing in reserve. However, in reality, this led to the fact that their total number (especially at the beginning of the battle) turned out to be less for us than for Napoleon. By the time of the decisive attack on the flushes by the French, they were hit by 400 guns, but they answered them 300
. In addition, then there was no radio or mobile communications ... While the adjutants on horseback managed to transmit the appropriate order, while a certain number of horse-drawn guns reached the place, while the horses were unharnessed and taken to cover, and the guns themselves began to shoot , quite a lot of time has passed. That is, our numerical advantage in artillery did not play any role in this battle!
Calculations and calculations
However, after all, we still do not know the effectiveness of the firing of our and French artillery, and this is a very important indicator. But it turns out that such comparative tests were carried out and gave very similar results. Why this is so is very easy to explain. The thing is that both the French and the Russians were armed with guns close in their combat qualities, based on the design General Griboval. When shooting at a target, the percentage of canister bullets that hit it was approximately the same: at a distance 600-650 meters an average of eight hits.
But this means that one artillery company in one salvo would have had about a hundred hits and could disable up to two infantry platoons, which attacked in close formation, and even at full height! Now suppose that about a third of all shots fired on the Borodino field, were card. You can calculate what they would have disabled 240 thousand people, while the actual losses were three times less.
This suggests that the accuracy of fire in combat conditions was greatly reduced due to smoke, enemy return fire, and also due to the fact that people in combat conditions are in a state of extreme stress.
"Shoot rarely, but accurately!"
So, the human factor had a great influence on the shooting results. AT "General Rules for Artillery in a Field Battle" entered just before the start Patriotic War, Major General A. I. Kutaisov wrote:
“In a field battle, shots for 500 fathoms (over 1000 meters. - V. Sh.) doubtful, for 300 (between 600 and 1000) they are quite true, and for 200 and 100 (from 400 and 200 to 600) they are deadly. Therefore, when the enemy is still at the first distance, you should shoot at him rarely in order to have time to aim the gun more accurately, in the second more often and finally strike with all possible speed in order to overturn and destroy him.
That is, the main requirement was still to shoot rarely, but accurately. Wherein in the battle of Borodino did not find application for the combat experience of Russian artillerymen XVIII century who are still during Battle of Gross-Jägersdorf fired over the head of their troops.
Accuracy in battle was greatly reduced, because the gunners, having taken up a firing position, were in a hurry to open fire, which led to less careful aiming. In addition, each next shot could only occur a minute after the previous one. And during this time, the enemy column managed to pass quickly almost 50 meters. This means that if an artillery company fired volleys of buckshot, and each volley destroyed two enemy platoons, then from a distance at 600 meters, giving 12 volleys, this company would have destroyed an entire regiment of infantry, which really did not happen.
What would happen if…
Thus, it can be concluded that artillery fire during Battle of Borodino, although it had an unprecedented character for that time, it was still not as effective as it could be, for a number of reasons.
The French did in this battle more than 60 thousand shots, that is, during 15 hours battles, their artillery every minute fired about 67 shells.
At the same time, from the French side, the fire was more frequent and intense, especially at the initial stage of the battle. And here we begin to understand that, although the French army "crashed against the Russian", it could have "crashed" even more if not for our artillery reserve in 305 guns, which immediately put the Russian army at a disadvantage in relation to the French! It turned out that having 53 guns more than the French, we nowhere gained an advantage in artillery and could not suppress the fire of the French batteries that opposed us.
Even two hundred-gun batteries mounted on the left flank of the Russian troops, firing point-blank at the attacking French, would most likely inflict much greater losses on them than those that actually were. And if some of the guns fired over the heads of our troops, then ... here we can already talk about losses that are completely unacceptable for the French.
In any case, today a number of historians conclusively argue that the losses of the Russian troops were not less, but 1.5-2 times more than the French. And that it was precisely because of this circumstance that our army was forced to retreat the next day. And although there are simply no people who would not make mistakes, it must be admitted that in this battle, mistakes on the part of Kutuzov, may have been, but in the end the war against Russia was lost Bonaparte, who was later forced to admit:
Of all my battles, the most terrible is the one I fought near Moscow. In it, the French showed themselves worthy of victory, and Russians have acquired the right to be invincible…
Vyacheslav SHPAKOVSKY.
From 1917 to 1991, many books were published in the USSR that proved the advantages of the Soviet way of life in all its manifestations. And the history of the past was embellished in such a way that now you don’t understand where the truth is and where the fiction is. And only today historians, and even then with considerable difficulty, are gradually beginning to get to the truth ...
MOIARUSSIA will try to figure it out, referring to a professional historian and expert in such matters.
WHO WIN THE BATTLE OF BORODINO?
What's question? Are not the words of General Yermolov written even in school textbooks: "The French army crashed against the Russian"? It was we who defeated Napoleon, not he us! All this, of course, is true. But if you look not only at the textbook, but also, for example, on the Internet, you can see how the information found there differs. The data on the number of troops on the battlefield do not match, and even in the notes of eyewitnesses of this battle there are serious discrepancies.
For example, there is evidence that Napoleon at Borodino had 135 thousand soldiers, while Kutuzov - 120. But other figures: the French - 133.8, the Russians - 154.8 thousand people. And which ones are true? Moreover, the same number includes 11 thousand Cossacks and 28.5 thousand militias. That is, numerically, we, it seems, in this case were superior to the French, but qualitatively they were superior to us, since the combat capabilities of the militias were small. But in all sources the number of guns is the same: we have 640 guns and the French have 587.
This means that we had 53 more guns, which at that time was a big force.
There is evidence that in the French army only 10% of the guns could shoot at 1000 meters, and the rest - at 600-700.
But in the Russian army there were more heavy guns capable of firing at 1200 m. In addition, it is easier to defend than to attack, especially on fortifications, even mediocre ones. Therefore, the losses of the attackers were always greater than those of the defenders!
Now let's look at the results of the battle.
The French themselves estimated their losses at 28 thousand people. Some books say that Napoleon lost 50, and Kutuzov - 44 thousand soldiers. However, there are other data that are directly opposite, and there is still no clarity on this important issue!
MAYBE A NUMERICAL ADVANTAGE?
It is known that Napoleon began his biography as an artillery officer and that he received good knowledge in this area, which he later often used in battles. Choosing the direction of the main attack, Bonaparte assembled a battery of a hundred or more guns, which ensured the continuity of fire.
The fact is that the then smooth-bore guns were reloaded rather slowly, and the batteries were fired not in one gulp, but with guns in turn. And if there were few guns in such a battery, then its commander had to wait until the servants loaded them all. When the last of the cannons of Napoleon's "great batteries" fired, the first was already loaded, so they fired continuously. Bonaparte acted in exactly the same way in the battle of Borodino.
But the Russian army used its guns more traditionally. Several dozen cannons were installed on the Semyonovsky flashes, on the Kurgan height and in many other places. However, their total number nowhere reached a hundred guns. Moreover, on the orders of Kutuzov, 305 guns were withdrawn to the reserve near the village of Psarevo, where they remained until the end of the battle. It is clear that the wrecked guns were constantly replaced by those standing in reserve.
However, in reality, this led to the fact that their total number (especially at the beginning of the battle) turned out to be less for us than for Napoleon. By the time of the decisive attack on the fleches by the French, 400 guns were hitting them, but 300 answered them.
In addition, then there was no radio or mobile communications ... While the adjutants on horseback managed to transmit the appropriate order, while a certain number of horse-drawn guns reached the place, while the horses were unharnessed and taken to cover, and the guns themselves began to shoot , quite a lot of time has passed. That is, our numerical advantage in artillery did not play any role in this battle!
CALCULATIONS AND CALCULATIONS
However, after all, we still do not know the effectiveness of the firing of our and French artillery, and this is a very important indicator. But it turns out that such comparative tests were carried out and gave very similar results. Why this is so is very easy to explain. The thing is that both the French and the Russians were armed with guns close in their combat qualities, based on the design of General Griboval. When shooting at a target, the percentage of canister bullets that hit it was approximately the same: at a distance of 600-650 meters, an average of eight hits.
But this means that one artillery company in one salvo would have had about a hundred hits and could disable up to two infantry platoons, which attacked in close formation, and even at full height!
Now suppose that about a third of all the shots fired on the Borodino field were grape shots. It can be calculated that they would put out of action 240 thousand people, while the actual losses were three times less.
This suggests that the accuracy of fire in combat conditions was greatly reduced due to smoke, enemy return fire, and also due to the fact that people in combat conditions are in a state of extreme stress.
"SHOOTING RARELY, YES ACUTE!"
So, the human factor had a great influence on the shooting results. In the "General Rules for Artillery in a Field Battle", introduced just before the start of World War II, Major General A.I. Kutaisov wrote:
“In a field battle, shots over 500 fathoms (over 1000 meters. - Approx. Ed.) are doubtful, over 300 (from 600 to 1000) are quite accurate, and over 200 and 100 (from 400 and 200 to 600) are deadly. Therefore, when the enemy is still at the first distance, you should shoot at him rarely in order to have time to aim the gun more accurately, in the second more often and finally strike with all possible speed in order to overturn and destroy him.
That is, the main requirement was still to shoot rarely, but accurately. At the same time, the combat experience of Russian artillerymen of the 18th century, who, even during the Battle of Gross-Jegersdorf, fired over the head of their troops, did not find application in the Battle of Borodino.
Accuracy in battle was greatly reduced, because the gunners, having taken up a firing position, were in a hurry to open fire, which led to less careful aiming. In addition, each next shot could only occur a minute after the previous one.
And during this time, the enemy column at a quick pace managed to pass almost 50 meters.
This means that if an artillery company fired volleys with buckshot, and each volley destroyed two enemy platoons, then from a distance of 600 meters, firing 12 volleys, this company would destroy an entire regiment of infantry, which really did not happen.
WHAT WOULD BE IF…
Thus, we can conclude that the artillery fire during the Battle of Borodino, although it was unprecedented for that time, was still not as effective as it could be, due to a number of circumstances.
The French fired more than 60,000 shots in this battle, that is, during the 15 hours of the battle, their artillery fired about 67 shells every minute.
At the same time, from the French side, the fire was more frequent and intense, especially at the initial stage of the battle. And here we begin to understand that, although the French army "crashed against the Russian", it could have "crashed" even more if it were not for our artillery reserve of 305 guns, which immediately put the Russian army at a disadvantage in terms of towards French!
It turned out that, having 53 guns more than the French, we did not get an advantage in artillery anywhere and could not suppress the opposing ones with fire. us French batteries.
Even two hundred-gun batteries mounted on the left flank of the Russian troops, firing point-blank at the attacking French, would most likely inflict much greater losses on them than those that actually were. And if some of the guns fired over the heads of our troops, then ... here we can already talk about losses that are completely unacceptable for the French.
In any case, today a number of historians conclusively assert that the losses of the Russian troops were not less, but 1.5-2 times more than those of the French. And that it was precisely because of this circumstance that our army was forced to retreat the next day. And although there are simply no people who would not make mistakes, it must be admitted that there were undoubtedly mistakes on the part of Kutuzov in this battle, even if in the end the war against Russia was lost by Bonaparte.